The Coalition government did indeed pass the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA), which gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies powers to require technology companies to decrypt communications or build new decryption capabilities [1].
The law creates three types of notices: Technical Assistance Requests (TARs - voluntary), Technical Assistance Notices (TANs - compulsory decryption), and Technical Capability Notices (TCNs - compulsory building of new decryption capabilities) [2][3].
Atlassian, a major Australian technology company, explicitly stated that "The Act's passage has significantly degraded the global reputation of the Australian tech sector" and noted anecdotal evidence of concerns from international customers about data security implications [1].
Huawei was banned from Australia's 5G network in 2020 by the same Coalition government, but this ban was **not** a consequence of the encryption law [4].
Rather, Huawei was banned specifically because the government assessed it as "likely to be subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government" presenting a national security risk [4].
Under the laws as currently written... [followed by details]" and notes it was "very rushed." However, Labor ultimately **supported** the bill when it was passed in Parliament [5].
Legitimate Security Justifications:** The law was created to address the problem of "going dark" - where encrypted communications prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from conducting investigations into serious crimes and terrorism [2].
Law enforcement cited this as a necessary tool; the AFP's "Operation Ironside" used powers under TOLA to conduct one of the largest organized crime operations, resulting in 224 arrests in Australia [2].
**3.
Limited Evidence of Sales Impact:** While Atlassian raised concerns and reported "anecdotal" customer inquiries, these are concerns and fears rather than documented lost sales.
Atlassian noted: "our fear is that these questions are not ones that we will necessarily hear from customers and customers who shy away from our products or services may never tell us that it is due to TOLA" [1].
Atlassian Atlassian 指出 zhǐ chū : : 「 「 我們 wǒ men 擔心 dān xīn 這些 zhè xiē 問題 wèn tí 不 bù 一定 yí dìng 是 shì 我們 wǒ men 會 huì 從 cóng 客戶 kè hù 那裡 nà lǐ 聽 tīng 到 dào 的 de , , 而 ér 迴 huí 避 bì 我們 wǒ men 產品 chǎn pǐn 或 huò 服務 fú wù 的 de 客戶 kè hù 可能 kě néng 永遠 yǒng yuǎn 不會 bù huì 告訴 gào sù 我們 wǒ men 這是 zhè shì 因為 yīn wèi TOLA TOLA 」 」 [ [ 1 1 ] ] 。 。
This is explicitly speculative, not evidence of actual sales decline.
**4.
這明確 zhè míng què 是 shì 推測性 tuī cè xìng 的 de , , 並非 bìng fēi 實際 shí jì 銷售 xiāo shòu 下滑 xià huá 的 de 證據 zhèng jù 。 。
No Statistical Data:** The claim provides no actual data on Australian tech exports declining after the law's passage.
Huawei is Not a Parallel Case:** The Huawei ban was a separate geopolitical decision made 2 years after the encryption law, based on concerns about Chinese government control - not because of encryption backdoors or foreign distrust of backdoored systems.
However, the article quotes Atlassian, which as an interested party advocating against the law, has institutional motivation to frame the law negatively.
文章 wén zhāng 確實 què shí 公正 gōng zhèng 呈現 chéng xiàn 了 le 公司 gōng sī 的 de 擔憂 dān yōu , , 但 dàn 主要 zhǔ yào 依賴 yī lài Atlassian Atlassian 的 de 陳 chén 述 shù , , 而 ér 非 fēi 對 duì 銷售 xiāo shòu 影響 yǐng xiǎng 的 de 獨立驗證 dú lì yàn zhèng 。 。
The article does present the company's concerns fairly, but relies primarily on Atlassian's statements rather than independent verification of sales impacts.
**Did Labor do something similar?**
Labor did not pass equivalent encryption backdoor legislation, but they explicitly **supported** the Coalition's TOLA Act when it was voted on in Parliament in 2018 [5].
* * * *
Labor's support was somewhat reluctant - party members raised concerns about privacy implications - but the party ultimately voted with the government to pass the law.
工黨 gōng dǎng 雖 suī 未通 wèi tōng 過 guò 同等 tóng děng 的 de 加密 jiā mì 後門 hòu mén 立法 lì fǎ , , 但 dàn 在 zài 2018 2018 年議 nián yì 會 huì 就 jiù TOLA TOLA 法案 fǎ àn 進行表 jìn xíng biǎo 決時 jué shí , , 他們 tā men 明確 míng què 支持 zhī chí 聯盟 lián méng 黨 dǎng 的 de 法案 fǎ àn [ [ 5 5 ] ] 。 。
This means Labor either agrees with the policy or accepted the Coalition's security rationale.
While critics argue the encryption law damages Australia's tech reputation and competitive advantage, several important points deserve consideration:
**Government's Position:** The law was justified as a necessary tool to combat terrorism and organized crime in an era of mass adoption of end-to-end encryption that prevents law enforcement access [2].
Without the law, agencies argue they cannot investigate serious crimes.
**Cross-Party Support:** This was not a unilateral Coalition decision - Labor agreed to the law, suggesting broad consensus on its necessity among Australia's political establishment [5].
**Limited Concrete Evidence:** The claim asserts sales damage as fact, but the evidence is speculative.
Some customers may have concerns, but this hasn't translated to documented mass defection [1].
**Huawei Distinction:** The claim conflates two separate government actions.
The Huawei 5G ban was a geopolitical decision made years later, based on concerns about Chinese government control, not a consequence of the encryption law.
Atlassian Atlassian 自身 zì shēn 的 de 證詞 zhèng cí 承認 chéng rèn 他們 tā men 沒有 méi yǒu 客戶 kè hù 因 yīn TOLA TOLA 而 ér 迴 huí 避 bì 其產品 qí chǎn pǐn 的 de 硬性 yìng xìng 數據 shù jù 。 。
Most countries (US, UK, Canada, etc.) also banned Huawei independent of their own encryption policies [4].
**Tech Industry Response:** While Atlassian raised concerns, there is limited evidence of broader Australian tech sector exodus or customer flight.
No mass business failures or revenue collapses have been documented [1][2].
**International Context:** Australia was not alone in pursuing encryption access.
The Five Eyes alliance (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) has all pursued similar "lawful access" frameworks, and the US continues to pressure tech companies on encryption access [3].
The core claims contain kernels of truth but are significantly misleading in framing and unsupported in key assertions:
- **TRUE:** Coalition passed TOLA enabling encryption backdoors [1][2][3]
- **TRUE:** International tech companies have expressed concerns about the law's impact [1]
- **PARTIALLY TRUE:** There are concerns about Australia's tech reputation, but limited evidence of quantified sales damage [1]
- **FALSE:** The Huawei comparison is misleading - the Huawei ban was a separate geopolitical decision unrelated to the encryption law [4]
- **MISLEADING BY OMISSION:** Labor supported the encryption law in Parliament [5], making this a cross-party policy, not uniquely Coalition
The claim cherry-picks concerns raised by one company (Atlassian) and presents them as established facts about industry-wide damage, while omitting that Labor supported the law and that international consensus exists on needing encryption access for law enforcement.
The core claims contain kernels of truth but are significantly misleading in framing and unsupported in key assertions:
- **TRUE:** Coalition passed TOLA enabling encryption backdoors [1][2][3]
- **TRUE:** International tech companies have expressed concerns about the law's impact [1]
- **PARTIALLY TRUE:** There are concerns about Australia's tech reputation, but limited evidence of quantified sales damage [1]
- **FALSE:** The Huawei comparison is misleading - the Huawei ban was a separate geopolitical decision unrelated to the encryption law [4]
- **MISLEADING BY OMISSION:** Labor supported the encryption law in Parliament [5], making this a cross-party policy, not uniquely Coalition
The claim cherry-picks concerns raised by one company (Atlassian) and presents them as established facts about industry-wide damage, while omitting that Labor supported the law and that international consensus exists on needing encryption access for law enforcement.