According to the government's official Department of Health report covering April 2020 to May 2021, by May 15, 2021, COVIDSafe identified 779 positive users who uploaded data, resulting in identification of 2,827 potential close contacts from 37,668 encounters [3].
More critically, a comprehensive peer-reviewed study published in The Lancet Public Health (February 2022) provides empirical evidence on actual effectiveness [4].
The empirical study examined NSW data from May 4 to November 4, 2020 (619 cases with over 25,300 close contacts) and found [5]:
- Only 137 (22%) of cases used the app
- App detected 205 contacts, but only 79 (39%) met the close contact definition
- 62 of the 79 contacts (78%) were ALREADY identified by manual contact tracing [5]
- Only 17 (<0.1%) of 25,300 close contacts were identified by app but NOT by manual tracing [5]
- No public exposure events were prevented by the app during the study period [5]
The claim conflates the app's early performance (June 2020) with its overall effectiveness, which requires important distinctions:
**Temporal distinction:** When the original sources were published in June 2020, the app was indeed detecting no cases [1].
By August 2022 (when the app was decommissioned), it had cost $21 million and identified only 2 unique cases over more than two years [6].
**Government claims and actual performance:** The government did claim the app would be valuable [3], but this was based on modeling rather than evidence from centralised contact tracing apps, which had no prior empirical evaluation at the time [5].
The app was designed for large-scale community transmission; Australia's suppression strategy meant only 0.03% of the population were infected at peak, limiting the app's operational context [3].
**Manual contact tracing comparison:** The claim that "traditional contact tracing methods are faster and more effective" is empirically supported [4][5].
Contact tracing staff reported that the app:
- Did not shorten the timeframe for identifying contacts [5]
- Generated high workload for staff reviewing false positives [5]
- Had poor reliability between iOS and Android devices [5]
- Did not work effectively unless actively running (not in background mode) [5]
**Did Labor propose alternative contact tracing approaches?**
Search conducted: "Labor government COVID-19 contact tracing policy app digital technology"
The evidence indicates Labor did not implement a competing contact tracing app during their period of government.
* * * *
However, when Mark Butler (Labor's Shadow Health Minister in 2021) reviewed the COVIDSafe performance, he declared it a "failed app" [6].
When Labor came to power, they decommissioned COVIDSafe in August 2022 after reviewing performance data showing only 2 unique cases identified across the entire two-year deployment [6].
然而 rán ér , , 當 dāng Mark Mark Butler Butler ( ( 2021 2021 年 nián Labor Labor 的 de 影子 yǐng zi 衛生 wèi shēng 部長 bù zhǎng ) ) 審查 shěn chá COVIDSafe COVIDSafe 表現 biǎo xiàn 時 shí , , 他 tā 宣布 xuān bù 這是 zhè shì 一個 yī gè 「 「 失敗 shī bài 的 de 應用 yīng yòng 程式 chéng shì 」 」 [ [ 6 6 ] ] 。 。
The equivalent comparison is not between parties' apps, but between digital vs. manual approaches - and both parties ultimately agreed that manual contact tracing was superior in Australia's epidemiological context.
While critics argue the government made false claims about COVIDSafe's utility, the full context reveals complexity:
**Government perspective:** Officials designed the app based on best available evidence at the time for potential large-scale community transmission [3].
The app's poor performance reflected Australia's successful suppression strategy (only 0.03% infected at peak) rather than the app's design flaws alone [3].
When the Herald Protocol was introduced (December 2020), Bluetooth performance improved significantly - handshakes per upload increased from ~2,000 to ~4,500 [3].
**Actual measured outcomes:** The peer-reviewed empirical evidence shows that while the app technically worked as designed, it provided minimal additional value [5].
This is not a flaw in the app's mechanics but a reflection of how effective Australia's manual contact tracing was.
**Key technical factors:**
- The app worked poorly on locked iPhones and in background mode, limiting real-world uptake [5]
- App adoption was only 22% among actual COVID cases, below the ~50% needed for effectiveness [5]
- The 15-minute proximity threshold was poorly calibrated - only 39% of app-suggested contacts were actually close contacts [5]
**Cost-benefit assessment:** The app cost $21 million total ($10M development, $7M advertising, $2.1M maintenance, $2M+ staff) [6] to prevent zero exposure events during a low-transmission period [5].
However, this must be contextualized: the app was deployed in anticipation of widespread transmission that never materialized in Australia, unlike other countries.
**Unique to Coalition or systemic?** This is not unique to the Coalition.
The UK (who developed a competing centralized app, then abandoned it) [5], and most other countries adopted the Apple-Google decentralized framework instead, suggesting this was a systemic problem with centralized digital contact tracing architecture, not Coalition mismanagement alone [5].
The claim accurately captures that (1) contacts identified by COVIDSafe were predominantly already identified by manual contact tracing, and (2) manual contact tracing was more effective.
政府 zhèng fǔ 的 de 早期 zǎo qī 通訊 tōng xùn 確實 què shí 過度 guò dù 誇大 kuā dà 了 le 應用 yīng yòng 程式 chéng shì 的 de 效用 xiào yòng 。 。
The government's early communications did overstate the app's utility.
However, the claim oversimplifies by conflating June 2020 performance (zero cases) with the app's full operational record, and by implying deliberate false attribution rather than optimistic performance expectations that proved unfounded.
The claim accurately captures that (1) contacts identified by COVIDSafe were predominantly already identified by manual contact tracing, and (2) manual contact tracing was more effective.
政府 zhèng fǔ 的 de 早期 zǎo qī 通訊 tōng xùn 確實 què shí 過度 guò dù 誇大 kuā dà 了 le 應用 yīng yòng 程式 chéng shì 的 de 效用 xiào yòng 。 。
The government's early communications did overstate the app's utility.
However, the claim oversimplifies by conflating June 2020 performance (zero cases) with the app's full operational record, and by implying deliberate false attribution rather than optimistic performance expectations that proved unfounded.