Water Minister Keith Pitt allocated $126.48 million to Murrumbidgee Irrigation for automation and infrastructure works designed to deliver 7.4 gigalitres (GL) of water savings, with 6.3 GL returning to the environment [1].
The Nature Conservation Council claimed the cost amounted to approximately $20,000 per megalitre (ML) for environmental water recovery in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area [2].
For comparison, environmental groups cited the most recent open market price for water entitlements at approximately $2,500 per ML in the Murrumbidgee [2].
The calculation would be: $126.48 million total - approximately $14.48 million fair market value ($2,500 × 5.8 GL) = approximately $112 million apparent overpayment.
The claim significantly oversimplifies the nature of these two different mechanisms:
**Critical distinction - different program types:** The $126.48 million was allocated under the "Off-farm Efficiency Program," not a direct water buyback.
This is infrastructure investment designed to reduce water losses through automation and channel improvements—a fundamentally different approach than purchasing water entitlements [1][3].
The government was not buying existing water rights; it was financing infrastructure to create new savings.
**Program design rationale:** Water Minister Barnaby Joyce (Nationals) had previously halted direct open-market water purchases, citing economic damage to rural communities from buying up water rights [1].
The efficiency programs were instead designed to achieve water recovery while keeping water within the agricultural sector, protecting rural employment.
This represented a policy choice with documented economic reasoning, not arbitrary overspending [1].
**Incomplete water recovery target:** The Productivity Commission's 2019 five-year review highlighted that the efficiency programs faced "real risks of failure" and had achieved only 1% of their 450 GL target by that point [1].
The Commission stated that both efficiency programs and supply-side projects were "far more costly than the alternative of buying back water from farmers" but noted governments had chosen this approach for socio-economic reasons [1].
**Comparative program costs across Basin:** By 2024, water recovery projects being quoted across states regularly exceeded $20,000 per megalitre [4], suggesting this was not an isolated overpayment but reflected broader program cost structures.
**Guardian reporting:** The source article is from Anne Davies, a Gold Walkley-winning investigative journalist who joined Guardian Australia in 2017 [5].
However, the January 2022 article is primarily reporting claims made by environmental groups rather than conducting original cost-benefit analysis [1].
**Environmental groups cited:** The Nature Conservation Council (NCC) and other environmental advocates are not independent analysts—they have explicit advocacy positions on water recovery methods and favor direct buybacks over efficiency programs [2].
Their mathematical calculation ($20,000 per ML) appears accurate, but their interpretation of what constitutes "value for money" reflects their policy preference, not objective assessment.
**Government position:** The government's framing emphasized that the Murrumbidgee project was "the final component" of a decade-long modernization program and would "halve water losses" through automation improvements [1].
他們 tā men 的 de 數學 shù xué 計算 jì suàn ( ( 每 měi ML ML 2 2 萬 wàn 澳元 ào yuán ) ) 看起 kàn qǐ 來 lái 準確 zhǔn què , , 但 dàn 他們 tā men 對 duì 何謂 hé wèi 「 「 物有所值 wù yǒu suǒ zhí 」 」 的 de 解釋 jiě shì 反映 fǎn yìng 了 le 他們 tā men 的 de 政策 zhèng cè 偏好 piān hǎo , , 而 ér 非 fēi 客觀 kè guān 評估 píng gū 。 。
Murrumbidgee Irrigation CEO Brett Jones characterized it as infrastructure development, not water purchase [1].
**Did Labor do something similar?**
Search conducted: "Labor government water buyback 2007-2013"
Labor's record (2007-2013): The Water Act 2007, passed under Howard (2007) but implemented substantially during Rudd-Gillard Labor (2008-2013), established the initial framework for water recovery in the Murray-Darling Basin [6].
* * * *
Labor endorsed and implemented buyback strategies as the primary mechanism for water recovery during their term.
搜索 sōu suǒ 內容 nèi róng : : 「 「 Labor Labor government government water water buyback buyback 2007 2007 - - 2013 2013 」 」
However, Labor-era buybacks occurred in fundamentally different market conditions.
By the Coalition government period (2013-2022), water scarcity and climate change had substantially increased water values and market prices, making direct purchases more expensive.
**Key distinction:** Labor pursued large-scale open-market buybacks when prices were lower (averaging around $1,500-$2,000 per ML in some periods).
然而 rán ér , , 工黨 gōng dǎng 時代 shí dài 的 de 回購 huí gòu 發生 fā shēng 在 zài 根本 gēn běn 不同 bù tóng 的 de 市場 shì chǎng 條件 tiáo jiàn 下 xià 。 。
The Coalition faced a situation where market prices had risen significantly, making the Nationals' political decision to shift toward efficiency programs more economically defensible, even if less cost-effective than Labor-era buybacks [6].
**Criticisms of the program are valid:** Environmental groups correctly identified that the cost-per-megalitre ($20,000) substantially exceeded what direct market purchases would cost.
The Productivity Commission explicitly stated that efficiency programs were "far more costly" than water buybacks [1].
這並 zhè bìng 非 fēi 不正 bù zhèng 確的 què de 環保 huán bǎo 倡議 chàng yì — — — — 而是 ér shì 得到 dé dào 官方 guān fāng 分析 fēn xī 支持 zhī chí 的 de 。 。
This is not incorrect environmental advocacy—it's supported by official analysis.
**However, the government's rationale was documented:** The Coalition government's chosen approach reflected an explicit policy decision: protect rural communities from the economic disruption of large-scale water buybacks.
The trade-off was acknowledged—more expensive water recovery in exchange for keeping water and employment within agricultural regions.
**Value for money questions persist:** The Productivity Commission's 2019 report identified that efficiency programs had delivered only 1% of their 450 GL recovery target by that point and faced "real risks of failure," which could cost taxpayers "about half a billion dollars" for further recovery efforts [1].
This suggests the efficiency programs were not only more expensive but also less certain to deliver intended outcomes.
**Recent ANAO audit findings:** A 2025 ANAO audit report on water buybacks found the government "implemented a well-paved road of effective process but struggled to find the link between the buyback program and the intended policy objectives for the Murray Darling Basin Plan" [7].
This indicates ongoing concerns about whether the spending achieved stated goals, regardless of which program type.
**Comparison to Labor's approach:** Labor pursued larger-scale direct buybacks when economically more feasible.
The Coalition pursued efficiency programs partly for ideological/political reasons (protecting rural interests) and partly because direct market purchases had become unaffordably expensive.
Neither approach appears to have solved fundamental problems with the Murray-Darling Basin Plan implementation [1][7].
**Key context:** This is not unique to the Coalition—water cost management has been problematic across both parties' attempts to implement the Basin Plan.
The factual claim that the government allocated $126.48 million for a project delivering water savings at approximately $20,000 per megalitre (8 times market rate) is accurate [1][2].
However, the claim's framing as a simple "overpayment" omits the policy choice behind the decision: the Coalition government deliberately chose infrastructure programs over direct market buybacks to protect rural communities, despite their higher per-megalitre cost [1].
The Productivity Commission confirmed this was indeed more expensive than alternatives, but the decision reflected explicit policy trade-offs, not waste or corruption [1].
The actual problem was program design failure—efficiency programs dramatically underdelivered on water recovery targets (1% of 450 GL goal by 2019), making the high cost per unit of actual recovered water even worse [1].
The factual claim that the government allocated $126.48 million for a project delivering water savings at approximately $20,000 per megalitre (8 times market rate) is accurate [1][2].
However, the claim's framing as a simple "overpayment" omits the policy choice behind the decision: the Coalition government deliberately chose infrastructure programs over direct market buybacks to protect rural communities, despite their higher per-megalitre cost [1].
The Productivity Commission confirmed this was indeed more expensive than alternatives, but the decision reflected explicit policy trade-offs, not waste or corruption [1].
The actual problem was program design failure—efficiency programs dramatically underdelivered on water recovery targets (1% of 450 GL goal by 2019), making the high cost per unit of actual recovered water even worse [1].