Partiellement vrai

Note : 6.5/10

Signaler un problème
Coalition
C0155

L'affirmation

“Assouplissement des règles de divulgation financière des entreprises pendant la pandémie, empêchant les investisseurs d'intenter des actions collectives contre les sociétés qui induisent le marché en erreur par omission d'informations importantes.”
COVID Économie
Source originale : Matthew Davis
Analysé : 29 Jan 2026

Sources originales

✅ VÉRIFICATION FACTUELLE

L'affirmation centrale est **substantiellement exacte**, mais nécessite des qualifications importantes concernant la portée et les mécanismes des changements de règles.
The core claim is **substantially accurate**, but requires significant qualification regarding the scope and mechanics of the rule changes.
 ### Chronologie des événements
### Timeline of Events
 Le gouvernement de la Coalition a effectivement assoupli les normes de divulgation financière des entreprises en réponse au COVID-19 par le biais du **Corporations (Coronavirus Economic Response) Determination (No. 2) 2020**, entré en vigueur le **26 mai 2020** [1][2].
The Coalition government did formally loosen corporate financial disclosure standards in response to COVID-19 through the **Corporations (Coronavirus Economic Response) Determination (No. 2) 2020**, which came into effect on **26 May 2020** [1][2].
 Le soulagement temporaire était initialement prévu pour expirer après 6 mois mais a été prolongé jusqu'au **23 mars 2021** (durée totale : 10 mois) [3].
The temporary relief was initially set to expire after 6 months but was subsequently extended through to **23 March 2021** (total duration: 10 months) [3].
 La modification clé a changé la norme de divulgation continue aux sections 674, 675 et 677 du Corporations Act en passant d'un **test objectif à un test subjectif** [1].
The key modification changed the continuous disclosure standard in sections 674, 675, and 677 of the Corporations Act by shifting from an **objective test to a subjective test** [1].
 Spécifiquement : - **Avant :** L'information devait être divulguée si « une personne raisonnable » s'attendait à ce qu'elle ait un effet significatif sur le prix ou la valeur des titres de la société (test objectif) - **Après :** L'information ne nécessite une divulgation que si l'entité « sait ou est négligente ou imprudente » quant à savoir si elle aurait un effet significatif (test subjectif nécessitant une preuve de faute) [2][4] Ce changement n'était pas une simple extension administrative mais une modification substantielle des normes de responsabilité.
Specifically: - **Before:** Information must be disclosed if "a reasonable person" would expect it to have a material effect on the price or value of the company's securities (objective test) - **After:** Information only requires disclosure if the entity "knows or is reckless or negligent" as to whether it would have a material effect (subjective test requiring proof of fault) [2][4] This change was not merely administrative deadline extension but a substantive modification to liability standards.
 ### Mise en œuvre permanente
### Permanent Implementation
 De manière critique, ces mesures de soulagement temporaire ont été **définitivement inscrites dans la loi** par le **Treasury Laws Amendment (2021 Measures No. 1) Act 2021**, adopté par le Parlement le **13 août 2021** [5][6].
Critically, these temporary relief measures were made **permanently law** through the **Treasury Laws Amendment (2021 Measures No. 1) Act 2021**, which passed Parliament on **13 August 2021** [5][6].
 L'amendement permanent a explicitement intégré l'élément de faute (connaissance, imprudence ou négligence) dans la section 674A du Corporations Act spécifiquement pour les plaideurs privés (actions collectives) [6].
The permanent amendment explicitly embedded the fault element (knowledge, recklessness, or negligence) into section 674A of the Corporations Act specifically for private litigants (class actions) [6].
 Les documents gouvernementaux indiquent explicitement que l'amendement de 2021 visait « expressément à réduire l'incidence des actions collectives opportunistes contre les sociétés cotées en bourse » [6].
Government documents explicitly state the 2021 Amendment was "expressly stated to be intended to reduce the incidence of opportunistic class actions against ASX-listed companies" [6].

Contexte manquant

### L'affirmation simplifie le mécanisme
### The Claim Oversimplifies the Mechanism
 L'affirmation déclare que les règles « empêchaient les investisseurs d'intenter des actions collectives ».
The claim states the rules "prevented investors from lodging class actions." This is inaccurate.
 C'est inexact.
Investors can still lodge class actions; the changes made it **harder and more expensive** to succeed in claims based on **omitted information** [7].
 Les investisseurs peuvent toujours intenter des actions collectives ; les changements ont rendu **plus difficile et plus coûteux** de réussir des réclamations basées sur des **informations omises** [7].
Specifically: - Investors can still sue if companies made **false statements**; the fault element does not apply to active misrepresentation [7][8] - Investors can still lodge class actions about omissions; they must now prove that directors were "negligent or reckless" about whether information was material [6][8] - Proving directors' negligence about omitted information requires discovery into board processes and deliberations, increasing litigation costs [7]
 Spécifiquement : - Les investisseurs peuvent toujours poursuivre si les entreprises ont fait des **déclarations fausses** ; l'élément de faute ne s'applique pas à la fausse représentation active [7][8] - Les investisseurs peuvent toujours intenter des actions collectives concernant des omissions ; ils doivent maintenant prouver que les directeurs étaient « négligents ou imprudents » quant à savoir si l'information était significative [6][8] - Prouver la négligence des directeurs concernant des informations omises nécessite une découverte des processus et délibérations du conseil, augmentant les coûts de litige [7]
### The Distinction: Omissions vs. Misstatements
 ### La distinction : Omissions vs fausses déclarations
Legal commentators noted that the temporary relief was "likely to be ineffective" because [7]: - Companies making **false statements** already faced liability under section 1041H (misleading or deceptive conduct) without any fault requirement - The relief only helped companies that omitted information entirely, not those that made inaccurate disclosures - The practical impact was narrower than the relief's scope suggested This is critical: the claim's framing of "mislead the market through omission of important information" is accurate regarding what the relief targeted, but not about prevention of litigation—it made such litigation more difficult, not impossible.
 Les commentateurs juridiques ont noté que le soulagement temporaire était « susceptible d'être inefficace » car [7] : - Les entreprises faisant des **fausses déclarations** étaient déjà responsables en vertu de la section 1041H (conduite trompeuse ou déceptive) sans aucune exigence de faute - Le soulagement n'aidait que les entreprises qui omettaient totalement l'information, pas celles qui faisaient des divulgations inexactes - L'impact pratique était plus étroit que la portée du soulagement ne le suggérait Ceci est critique : le cadrage de l'affirmation sur « induire le marché en erreur par omission d'informations importantes » est exact quant à ce que le soulagement visait, mais pas sur la prévention des litiges — cela a rendu ces litiges plus difficiles, pas impossibles.
### Duration Beyond Pandemic
 ### Durée au-delà de la pandémie
The claim references pandemic-era loosening, which is accurate for the initial May 2020 change.
 L'affirmation fait référence à l'assouplissement de l'ère pandémique, ce qui est exact pour le changement initial de mai 2020.
However, the permanent August 2021 amendment applies **to all future continuous disclosure matters indefinitely**, not just pandemic-period disclosures [5].
 Cependant, l'amendement permanent d'août 2021 s'applique **à toutes les questions futures de divulgation continue indéfiniment**, pas seulement aux divulgations de la période pandémique [5].
This expanded the scope far beyond the intended temporary relief, though this expansion occurred through permanent legislation rather than an extension of emergency measures.
 Ceci a élargi la portée bien au-delà du soulagement temporaire prévu, bien que cette expansion se soit produite par législation permanente plutôt que par une extension des mesures d'urgence.
### ASIC's Contradictory Focus
 ### Focus contradictoire de l'ASIC
Notably, ASIC's media releases during 2020 show the regulator actually wanted **more** disclosure of COVID-related impacts, not less [9][10].
 Il est à noter que les communiqués de presse de l'ASIC en 2020 montrent que le régulateur voulait en fait **plus** de divulgation des impacts liés au COVID, pas moins [9][10].
ASIC specifically emphasized that entities should prominently disclose: - Significant COVID-related support amounts received - Government assistance details (JobKeeper, tax relief, loan deferrals) - Asset value impacts from pandemic effects - Business risks and uncertainties [9][10] ASIC's regulatory focus suggests the relaxation was intended to provide breathing room during extreme uncertainty, not to facilitate non-disclosure.
 L'ASIC a spécifiquement souligné que les entités devaient divulguer de manière prééminente : - Les montants significatifs de soutien liés au COVID reçus - Les détails de l'aide gouvernementale (JobKeeper, allégements fiscaux, reports de prêts) - Les impacts sur la valeur des actifs des effets de la pandémie - Les risques et incertitudes commerciaux [9][10] Le focus réglementaire de l'ASIC suggère que l'assouplissement était destiné à offrir un répit pendant une période d'extrême incertitude, pas à faciliter la non-divulgation.

Évaluation de la crédibilité de la source

### Source originale : Article AFR
### Original Source: AFR Article
 L'Australian Financial Review (AFR) est une **organisation d'information grand public crédible** avec un historique de reportage commercial et financier [11].
The Australian Financial Review (AFR) is a **mainstream, credible news organization** with a track record of business and financial reporting [11].
 L'AFR : - Est détenu par Nine Entertainment (un grand groupe média australien) - Emploie des journalistes spécialisés en finances et politique - A une réputation pour le reportage commercial détaillé (bien que le contenu payant puisse refléter leur modèle d'abonnement) - Le cadrage du titre (« companies-get-an-extension-to-shield-against-class-actions ») est un commentaire éditorial, reflétant l'interprétation de l'AFR de l'impact de la politique **Évaluation :** L'AFR est une source réputée, mais l'article traite de la mise en œuvre de la politique gouvernementale pendant une période de crise.
AFR: - Is owned by Nine Entertainment (a major Australian media company) - Employs specialized financial and political journalists - Has reputation for detailed business reporting (though paywalled content may reflect their subscription model) - The headline framing ("companies-get-an-extension-to-shield-against-class-actions") is editorial commentary, reflecting AFR's interpretation of the policy's impact **Assessment:** AFR is a reputable source, but the article is reporting on government policy implementation during crisis period.
 Le cadrage « bouclier contre les actions collectives » dans l'URL montre une interprétation éditoriale de l'effet du soulagement, qui correspond aux analyses juridiques montrant une protection accrue pour les entreprises [5][6][7].
The "shield against class actions" framing in the URL shows editorial interpretation of the relief's effect, which aligns with legal analyses showing increased protection for companies [5][6][7].
 ### Vérification par des sources juridiques
### Verification Through Legal Sources
 Le contenu factuel de l'affirmation est corroboré par : - **Corrs Chambers Westgarth** (grand cabinet d'avocats australien) : Analyse détaillée des changements de mai 2020 [4] - **Herbert Smith Freehills** (grand cabinet d'avocats international) : A confirmé que le gouvernement cherchait un assouplissement permanent des règles de divulgation [2] - **Hamilton Locke** (cabinet d'avocats australien) : A noté le passage par le Parlement du controversé amendement de 2021 avec l'intention explicite de réduire les actions collectives [5] - **Communiqués de presse de l'ASIC** (autorité réglementaire) : Ont documenté la position officielle sur les priorités de divulgation [9][10] Ces sources confirment que les changements de politique étaient réels et substantiels, non exagérés ou fabriqués par l'AFR.
The claim's factual content is corroborated by: - **Corrs Chambers Westgarth** (major Australian law firm): Detailed analysis of the May 2020 changes [4] - **Herbert Smith Freehills** (major international law firm): Confirmed government sought permanent easing of disclosure rules [2] - **Hamilton Locke** (Australian law firm): Noted Parliament's passage of controversial 2021 Amendment with explicit intent to reduce class actions [5] - **ASIC media releases** (regulatory authority): Documented official position on disclosure priorities [9][10] These sources confirm the policy changes were real and substantive, not exaggerated or fabricated by AFR.
⚖️

Comparaison avec Labor

**Le Labour a-t-il fait quelque chose de similaire ?** Le Labour n'a pas introduit d'allégement équivalent temporaire de la divulgation lors de crises précédentes.
**Did Labor do something similar?** Labor did not introduce equivalent temporary disclosure relief during previous crises.
 Cependant, la réponse du Labour à l'amendement de 2021 (lorsqu'ils sont arrivés au pouvoir en mai 2022) est instructive :
However, Labor's response to the 2021 Amendment (when they came to power in May 2022) is instructive:
 ### Réponse du Labour 2022-2024
### Labor's 2022-2024 Response
 1. **Examen indépendant :** Le Labour a nommé l'examinateur indépendant Kevin Lewis pour évaluer si l'amendement de 2021 fonctionnait comme prévu [12] 2. **Approche bifurquée :** Plutôt que de révoquer complètement l'amendement de 2021, le Labour a : - **Révoqué l'élément de faute pour l'application par l'ASIC** (pour que les régulateurs puissent poursuivre les violations sans prouver la faute) [12] - **Maintenu l'élément de faute pour les plaideurs privés** (les actions collectives restent soumises à une barre plus élevée) [12] 3. **Résultat :** En 2024, la structure reste : l'ASIC peut poursuivre facilement les cas de divulgation continue, mais les plaignants en actions collectives doivent prouver la négligence concernant les informations omises [12]
1. **Independent Review:** Labor appointed independent reviewer Kevin Lewis to assess whether the 2021 Amendment was working as intended [12] 2. **Bifurcated Approach:** Rather than fully repealing the 2021 Amendment, Labor: - **Repealed the fault element for ASIC enforcement** (so regulators can prosecute breaches without proving fault) [12] - **Retained the fault element for private litigants** (class actions remain subject to higher bar) [12] 3. **Result:** As of 2024, the structure remains: ASIC can pursue continuous disclosure cases easily, but class action plaintiffs must prove negligence about omitted information [12]
 ### Évaluation
### Assessment
 Cela suggère que le Labour a accepté que les restrictions permanentes aux actions collectives aient un mérite pratique (réduire les coûts de litiges frivoles pour les entreprises) tout en reconnaissant que l'application réglementaire devrait rester robuste [12].
This suggests Labor accepted that the permanent class action restrictions have practical merit (reducing frivolous litigation costs for companies) while recognizing that regulatory enforcement should remain robust [12].
 Le Labour n'a pas fait de changements opposés ; ils ont fait des ajustements ciblés. **Conclusion :** Le Labour n'a pas d'équivalent direct de leur précédent mandat.
Labor did not make opposite changes; they made targeted refinements. **Conclusion:** Labor does not have a direct equivalent from their previous time in office.
 La comparaison la plus proche est la décision du Labour en 2023-2024 de **maintenir la plupart des restrictions en place** plutôt que de restaurer complètement les normes d'avant 2020, suggérant une acceptation interpartis de certaines limitations supplémentaires aux actions collectives.
The closest comparison is Labor's decision in 2023-2024 to **keep most of the restrictions in place** rather than fully restore pre-2020 standards, suggesting cross-party acceptance of some additional class action limitations.
🌐

Perspective équilibrée

### Arguments soutenant l'assouplissement
### Arguments Supporting the Relaxation
 **1.
**1.
 Contexte de pandémie** En mai 2020, lorsque le Décret a été mis en œuvre, l'Australie faisait face à une extrême incertitude concernant : - La transmission et les impacts sanitaires du COVID-19 (changeant chaque semaine) - La durée et la sévérité de l'impact économique - Les perturbations des chaînes d'approvisionnement - La durée et la portée des confinements Les directeurs faisaient face à des difficultés réelles pour prédire quelle information serait « significative » pour les investisseurs lorsque les paramètres fondamentaux étaient inconnus.
Pandemic Context** In May 2020, when the Determination was implemented, Australia faced extreme uncertainty about: - COVID-19 transmission and health impacts (changing weekly) - Economic impact duration and severity - Supply chain disruptions - Lockdown duration and scope Directors faced genuine difficulties predicting what information would be "material" to investors when fundamental parameters were unknown.
 L'élément de faute (négligence) offrait une protection pour les décisions de divulgation raisonnables prises dans des circonstances d'extrême incertitude, plutôt que de protéger la non-divulgation délibérée [4]. **2.
The fault element (negligence) provided protection for reasonable disclosure decisions made under extreme uncertainty, rather than protecting deliberate non-disclosure [4]. **2.
 Risque de litiges opportunistes** Les commentateurs juridiques ont noté que sans ce soulagement, les entreprises pourraient faire face à des actions collectives pour avoir omis de divulguer des informations qui n'auraient pas pu raisonnablement être évaluées comme significatives [7].
Opportunistic Litigation Risk** Legal commentators noted that without such relief, companies might face class actions for failing to disclose information that couldn't reasonably have been assessed as material [7].
 Le soulagement protégeait les entreprises contre les litiges où les décisions de divulgation, bien qu'apparaissant ultérieurement comme inadéquates, étaient raisonnables au moment de la décision [5]. **3.
The relaxation protected companies from litigation where disclosure decisions, while later appearing inadequate, were reasonable at the time of decision [5]. **3.
 Coût de conformité** Des règles de responsabilité de divulgation plus agressives augmentent les coûts pour toutes les entreprises, en particulier les petites et moyennes capitalisations qui n'ont pas d'infrastructure de conformité sophistiquée.
Cost of Compliance** More aggressive disclosure liability rules increase costs for all companies, particularly small-to-mid-cap firms that lack sophisticated compliance infrastructure.
 Le soulagement temporaire a réduit la pression de conformité pendant une période de crise.
The temporary relaxation reduced compliance pressure during a crisis period.
 ### Arguments contre l'assouplissement / En faveur de la protection des investisseurs
### Arguments Against the Relaxation / In Favor of Investor Protection
 **1.
**1.
 Problème de mise en œuvre permanente** La critique fondamentale est que le soulagement d'urgence temporaire est devenu **loi permanente par le biais de l'amendement d'août 2021** [5][6].
Permanent Implementation Problem** The fundamental criticism is that temporary emergency relief became **permanent law through the August 2021 Amendment** [5][6].
 Alors que les circonstances d'urgence en mai 2020 pourraient justifier une flexibilité temporaire, la mise en œuvre permanente de ces changements (août 2021, bien après le début du redressement économique) a déplacé la politique d'une réponse de crise vers une réduction permanente de la protection des investisseurs [6][8].
While emergency circumstances in May 2020 might justify temporary flexibility, making these changes permanent (August 2021, well into economic recovery) shifted the policy from crisis response to permanent investor protection reduction [6][8].
 Les documents gouvernementaux indiquent que l'amendement permanent visait « à réduire l'incidence des actions collectives opportunistes » — une préférence politique non liée à la réponse à la pandémie [5]. **2.
Government documents state the permanent amendment was "intended to reduce the incidence of opportunistic class actions"—a policy preference unrelated to pandemic response [5]. **2.
 Déplacement du fardeau vers les investisseurs** L'élément de faute affecte spécifiquement les actions collectives basées sur des **omissions** — des informations non divulguées.
Burden Shift to Investors** The fault element specifically affects class actions based on **omissions**—information not disclosed.
 En exigeant que les investisseurs prouvent que les directeurs étaient négligents quant à la significativité, la loi place le fardeau de découverte sur les plaignants plutôt que d'exiger des entreprises qu'elles justifient la non-divulgation [6][7][8].
By requiring investors to prove directors were negligent about materiality, the law places discovery burden on plaintiffs rather than requiring companies to justify non-disclosure [6][7][8].
 Ceci affecte de manière disproportionnée : - Les investisseurs de détail manquant de ressources pour une découverte complexe - Les entreprises prenant des décisions délibérées de ne pas divulguer des informations défavorables espérant qu'elles se résoudraient - Les situations où les directeurs ont simplement omis de considérer si l'information était significative [7] **3.
This disproportionately affects: - Retail investors lacking resources for complex discovery - Companies making deliberate decisions not to disclose adverse information hoping it would resolve - Situations where directors simply failed to consider whether information was material [7] **3.
 Comparaison avec d'autres juridictions** Le régime américain de divulgation continue (Section 10(b) du Securities Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5) exige la scienter (intention/connaissance) mais est interprété plus largement que l'exigence australienne. **4.
Comparison to Other Jurisdictions** The US continuous disclosure regime (Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5) requires scienter (intent/knowledge) but is interpreted more broadly than the Australian requirement [citations would require US securities law research]. **4.
 Position réglementaire réelle de l'ASIC** Malgré le désir du Trésor de réduire les actions collectives, les communiqués de presse de l'ASIC en 2020 montraient que le régulateur voulait que les entreprises divulguent plus d'informations liées au COVID, pas moins [9][10].
ASIC's Actual Regulatory Position** Despite Treasury's desire to reduce class actions, ASIC's 2020 media releases showed the regulator wanted companies to disclose more COVID-related information, not less [9][10].
 Cela suggère que les objectifs réglementaires et législatifs ont divergé — le Trésor voulait la protection contre les litiges, l'ASIC voulait la transparence de divulgation.
This suggests regulatory and legislative goals diverged—Treasury wanted litigation protection, ASIC wanted disclosure transparency.

PARTIELLEMENT VRAI

6.5

sur 10

L'affirmation est factuellement correcte en ce que la Coalition a assoupli les règles de divulgation financière des entreprises pendant la pandémie avec l'effet de réduire l'exposition à la responsabilité des actions collectives.
The claim is factually correct that the Coalition loosened corporate financial disclosure rules during the pandemic with the effect of reducing class action liability exposure.
 Cependant, la caractérisation nécessite des précisions : 1. **Ce qui est exact :** La Coalition a effectivement assoupli les règles en mai 2020 spécifiquement pour réduire le risque d'actions collectives ; les changements ont été rendus permanents en août 2021 ; ils affectent spécifiquement les litiges des investisseurs concernant des informations omises [1][2][5] 2. **Ce qui est simplifié :** Les règles n'« empêchent pas les investisseurs d'intenter des actions collectives » — elles rendent les actions collectives basées sur des omissions plus difficiles en exigeant que les plaignants prouvent la négligence.
However, the characterization requires clarification: 1. **What's Accurate:** The Coalition did loosen rules in May 2020 specifically to reduce class action risk; the changes were made permanent in August 2021; they do specifically affect litigation by investors over omitted information [1][2][5] 2. **What's Oversimplified:** The rules don't "prevent investors from lodging class actions"—they make omission-based class actions more difficult by requiring plaintiffs to prove negligence.
 Les entreprises sont toujours pleinement responsables des fausses déclarations.
Companies are still fully liable for false statements.
 Les investisseurs peuvent toujours poursuivre ; le litige est plus coûteux [6][7][8] 3. **Ce qui manque :** La mise en œuvre permanente en août 2021 était un choix politique délibéré non lié à la réponse à la pandémie, élargissant la portée du soulagement au-delà des circonstances de crise [5].
Investors can still sue; litigation is more costly [6][7][8] 3. **What's Missing:** The permanent implementation in August 2021 was a deliberate policy choice unrelated to pandemic response, expanding the relief's scope beyond crisis circumstances [5].
 L'examen effectué par le Labour en 2023-2024 a maintenu les restrictions en place, suggérant une acceptation interpartis [12] **La reformulation la plus exacte de l'affirmation :** « La Coalition a temporairement assoupli les règles de divulgation continue pendant la pandémie (mai 2020), rendant plus difficile (mais pas impossible) pour les investisseurs d'intenter des actions collectives spécifiquement concernant des informations omises.
Labor's 2023-2024 review kept restrictions in place, suggesting cross-party acceptance [12] **The most accurate restatement of the claim:** "The Coalition temporarily loosened continuous disclosure rules during the pandemic (May 2020), making it harder (but not impossible) for investors to lodge class actions specifically over omitted information.
 Ces règles temporaires ont été rendues permanentes en août 2021 en étendant l'élément de faute (nécessitant la preuve de négligence) à toutes les violations de divulgation continue.
These temporary rules were made permanent in August 2021 by extending the fault element (requiring proof of negligence) to all continuous disclosure violations.
 Le Labour a maintenu ces restrictions en place lors de leur examen en 2023-2024. »
Labor kept these restrictions in place when reviewing them in 2023-2024."

📚 SOURCES ET CITATIONS (12)

  1. 1
    corrs.com.au

    Corrs Chambers Westgarth - COVID-19: important changes to continuous disclosure provisions

    Corrs Com

  2. 2
    herbertsmithfreehills.com

    Herbert Smith Freehills - Australian Federal Government seeks to permanently ease continuous disclosure rules

    Herbertsmithfreehills

  3. 3
    Lexology - Temporary changes to Australia's continuous disclosure regime are here to stay

    Lexology - Temporary changes to Australia's continuous disclosure regime are here to stay

    The federal government has announced that temporary changes to continuous disclosure obligations imposed on listed companies under the Corporations…

    Lexology
  4. 4
    Clifford Chance - Caution! Temporary changes to Australian continuous disclosure regime likely to be ineffective

    Clifford Chance - Caution! Temporary changes to Australian continuous disclosure regime likely to be ineffective

    The temporary changes, which are in effect for six months from 26 May 2020, ignore a number of provisions commonly invoked by class action plaintiffs to pursue damages claims in relation to alleged continuous disclosure failings

    Clifford Chance
  5. 5
    Hamilton Locke - Parliament Passes Controversial Changes to Australia's Continuous Disclosure Laws

    Hamilton Locke - Parliament Passes Controversial Changes to Australia's Continuous Disclosure Laws

    The Treasury Laws Amendment (2021 Measures No. 1) Bill 2021 has passed both houses of Parliament and is expected to receive Royal Assent sometime in August. It represents a significant shift in what consequences apply to companies and their directors and officers for a breach of the continuous disclosure laws. The continuous disclosure obligations remain

    Hamilton Locke - Smarter. Different.
  6. 6
    Allens - Will new continuous disclosure laws limit shareholder class actions?

    Allens - Will new continuous disclosure laws limit shareholder class actions?

    Following a period of temporary reform, Australia's continuous disclosure regime has been permanently amended in an effort to combat the upward trend of opportunistic shareholder class actions and to put downward pressure on premiums for directors and officers insurance

    Allens Com
  7. 7
    Jones Day - ASIC Enforcement of Australia's Continuous Disclosure Regime Gets a Boost

    Jones Day - ASIC Enforcement of Australia's Continuous Disclosure Regime Gets a Boost

    <div><p>The Australian federal government recently issued its response to the "report of the independent review of the changes to the continuous disclosure laws" prepared by Dr Kevin Lewis (Independent Review). In its response, the government accepted the key recommendations of the Independent Review, with the market now awaiting details of the introduction of amending legislation by the government, including likely timing.</p><p><strong>Recap of the Independent Review</strong></p><p>The government, as required under the <em>Corporations Act 2001</em> (Cth), commissioned the Independent Review into the changes introduced into Australia's continuous disclosure regime back in 2021, under the <em>Treasury Laws Amendment (2021 Measures No.1) Act 2021 </em>(Cth). The changes were expressly stated to be intended to reduce the incidence of opportunistic class actions against ASX-listed companies accused of not keeping the market informed of price sensitive information. The key aspect of the amendments was to introduce a fault element into the continuous disclosure laws, which meant that it was a requirement for a plaintiff or regulator to demonstrate that a disclosing entity or its officers had acted with either knowledge, recklessness or negligence, in breaching their continuous disclosure obligations for civil liability actions.</p><p>Despite commenting that the two-year review period since the changes was insufficient to draw meaningful evidence-based conclusions on many matters included in the Terms of Reference, the Independent Review made six recommendations—with the government subsequently announcing its support for four of the recommendations, and noting the remaining two.</p><p><strong>Primary Recommendations Arising From the Independent Review</strong></p><p>The government agreed with the following primary recommendations:</p><ul><li>Removal of the requirement that ASIC needs to prove in civil penalty proceedings for a breach of continuous disclosure laws that the disclosing entity acted knowingly, recklessly or negligently; and</li><li>Retention "for the time being" of the requirement that private litigants in civil compensation proceedings need to provide that the disclosing entity acted knowingly, recklessly or negligently. </li></ul><p><strong>Disclosing Entities Must Maintain a Strong Focus on Compliance With Their Continuous Disclosure Obligations—Removal of the "Fault Element" Coupled With ASIC's Enforcement Focus Could Lead to an Increase in ASIC Actions</strong></p><p>One of the primary findings of the Independent Review was that the 2021 Amendments have had, and are likely to continue to have, a negative impact on ASIC's enforcement of the continuous disclosure laws.</p><p>In its submission to the Independent Review, ASIC remarked that, in the context of issuing infringement notices, the need to ultimately prove the "fault element" (as part of bringing civil penalty proceedings for contravening conduct when an infringement notice penalty is not paid) was likely to reduce ASIC's appetite to use infringement notices for contraventions of continuous disclosure. Accordingly, the recommended removal of the "fault element" may encourage ASIC to increase its issuance of infringement notices.</p><p>The key takeaway of the removal of the fault element, if this recommendation is given effect by legislative changes, is that ASIC will be able to pursue enforcement action (including civil penalty proceedings) for unintentional or inadvertent breaches of Australia's continuous disclosure laws. It is therefore critical that disclosing entities renew their focus on their continuous disclosure obligations and related policies and processes.</p><p>Finally, companies, directors and officers should have regard to the proposed release in early 2025 of the <em>ASX Corporate Governance Council's fifth edition Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations</em>, which also makes recommendations in relation to continuous disclosure policy and process matters.</p><p><strong>Practical Effect of the 2021 Amendments on Continuous Disclosure-Related Class Actions Remains Undecided—"Fault Element" Retained (for Now)</strong></p><p>In its response, the government noted that a diversity of views were expressed and submissions received during the consultation period for the Independent Review. In that context, the Independent Review observed that the 2021 Amendments have had, and are likely to continue to have, little (if any) impact on the number and types of continuous disclosure class actions against disclosing entities and that meritorious continuous disclosure class actions are still likely to proceed.</p><p>The government agreed with the recommendation to retain—for the time being—the requirement for private litigants to prove the "fault element" in continuous disclosure-related class actions. </p><p>Given the comment that the review period was too short to discern any pattern arising from the 2021 Amendments in the number of continuous disclosure class actions, we expect the government to continue monitoring the situation for the emergence of any negative effect as a result of class action filings on disclosure standards. We expect both proponents and defendants of class actions to put forward different perspectives on the statistics and (any) causal links. </p><p><strong>Climate-Related Financial Disclosures Remain in Focus</strong></p><p>The consultation process for the Independent Review flushed out some concerns between the interplay between the 2021 Amendments and potential class action risks arising from the mandatory climate-related reporting requirements, particularly in relation to the forward-looking statements required by that regime. </p><p>The government's response to the Independent Review said that it had considered the implications of Recommendations 1 and 2 (as set out above) as part of its process to implement the climate-related disclosure legislation. The key point for companies, directors and officers is that they should remain alive to the prospect of enforcement action by ASIC utilizing the continuous disclosure regime, as well as other legislative provisions, in relation to their climate-related disclosures, once that regime comes into effect (which is expected to occur from 1 January 2025). The retention of the fault element for private litigants will provide some assistance to companies who may find themselves defending those claims, as will the transitional modified liability regime for private actions included in the incoming climate-related disclosure legislation.</p></div>

    Jonesday
  8. 8
    Addisons - Continuous disclosure regime: back to the future

    Addisons - Continuous disclosure regime: back to the future

    With discussions about amending the Corporations Act to strengthen ASIC’s powers to enforce continuous disclosure obligations, ASX-listed companies should review their internal policies regarding ongoing disclosure obligations.

    Addisons | Sydney Law Firm
  9. 9
    ASIC 20-157MR - Focuses for financial reporting under COVID-19 conditions

    ASIC 20-157MR - Focuses for financial reporting under COVID-19 conditions

    Fair, strong and efficient financial system for all Australians.

    Asic Gov
  10. 10
    ASIC 20-325MR - ASIC highlights focus areas for 31 December 2020 financial reports under COVID-19 conditions

    ASIC 20-325MR - ASIC highlights focus areas for 31 December 2020 financial reports under COVID-19 conditions

    Fair, strong and efficient financial system for all Australians.

    Asic Gov
  11. 11
    Australian Financial Review - About AFR

    Australian Financial Review - About AFR

    The Australian Financial Review reports the latest news from business, finance, investment and politics, updated in real time. It has a reputation for independent, award-winning journalism and is essential reading for the business and investor community.

    Australian Financial Review
  12. 12
    PDF

    Treasury.gov.au - Government response to Independent Review on continuous disclosure laws

    Treasury Gov • PDF Document

Méthodologie de l'échelle de notation

1-3: FAUX

Factuellement incorrect ou fabrication malveillante.

4-6: PARTIEL

Une part de vérité mais le contexte manque ou est biaisé.

7-9: MAJORITAIREMENT VRAI

Détails techniques mineurs ou problèmes de formulation.

10: EXACT

Parfaitement vérifié et contextuellement équitable.

Méthodologie: Les notations sont déterminées par recoupement des documents gouvernementaux officiels, des organisations indépendantes de vérification des faits et des documents sources primaires.

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