Partially True

Rating: 6.5/10

Coalition
C0076

The Claim

“Broke their own law by not conducting a report into the privacy impacts and effectiveness of the COVIDSafe app every 6 months.”
Original Source: Matthew Davis
Analyzed: 29 Jan 2026

Original Sources Provided

FACTUAL VERIFICATION

The claim contains two distinct allegations: (1) a legal requirement for 6-monthly reports existed and (2) the government failed to conduct these reports. Both are partially substantiated, but with important nuances about timing and compliance.

The Legal Requirement Existed

The Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act 2020 (specifically Section 94ZA) established a clear legal requirement that the Health Minister must produce reports on COVIDSafe's operation and effectiveness [1]. The legislation mandates:

  • Frequency: Reports must be produced every 6 months [2]
  • Tabling requirement: Reports must be tabled in Parliament within 15 sitting days of completion [3]
  • Duration: This requirement applies "as long as the app remains operational" [4]

This was genuine law—passed by Parliament and binding on the government. The requirement was not discretionary [5].

Reports Were Conducted—But with Significant Delays

Contrary to the claim's implication that no reports were conducted, the government did produce COVIDSafe reports [6]. However, these reports were significantly delayed:

Documented Reports:

  1. First Report (Coverage: 16 May 2020 - 15 November 2020)

    • Statutory deadline for tabling: December 2020 (15 sitting days after 15 November)
    • Actually published: July 2021
    • Delay: ~7 months overdue [7]
  2. Second Report (Coverage: 16 May 2021 - 15 November 2021)

    • Statutory deadline for tabling: December 2021
    • Actually published: December 2021
    • Delay: Minimal, tabled in time [8]
  3. Third Report (Coverage: 16 May 2022 - 16 August 2022)

    • Should have been tabled: September 2022
    • Actually published: June 2023
    • Delay: ~8-9 months overdue [9]
  4. Final Report (Decommissioning phase)

    • Tabled Parliament: 30 March 2023 [10]

Evidence of Compliance Issues:
InnovationAus reporting indicates that government was "forced to release overdue COVIDSafe report" after pressure and that reports appeared "nearly a year overdue" [11]. This suggests the government was aware of the deadlines but failed to meet them consistently.

The Critical Legal Question

Whether the government "broke their own law" depends on whether delayed tabling constitutes a breach of the statutory requirement. The legislation states reports must be tabled "within 15 sitting days" [12]. The first and third reports being 7-9 months late appears to objectively breach this requirement [13].

However: No court proceedings or formal finding of breach has been publicly documented [14]. The claim uses colloquial language ("broke their own law") which is technically accurate if the statutory deadline was missed, but the government was not formally prosecuted or found in breach in a legal proceeding [15].

Missing Context

What the Claim Emphasizes vs. What It Omits

1. Reports Were Eventually Published:
The claim's language ("broke their own law by not conducting a report") could be read as suggesting no reports were produced at all. In fact, multiple reports were published, though late [16]. This is different from refusing to conduct reports—it's failing to meet deadlines.

2. What the Reports Actually Showed:
The delayed reports revealed concerning information about COVIDSafe effectiveness:

  • Only 2 positive COVID cases were identified through the app that manual contact tracers hadn't already identified [17]
  • Only 792 COVID-positive users (out of millions of app users) consented to upload their data to the national database [18]
  • The app had a 61% false positive rate for contact detection [19]
  • App cost approximately $21 million total, or ~$10.5 million per case actually identified [20]
  • University of New South Wales research found the app detected only 15% of true close contacts identified by conventional contact tracing [21]

These findings suggest the reports, when eventually released, showed a remarkably ineffective app. The delay in releasing these reports meant this poor performance was concealed from the public for months or years.

3. Timeline Context:
The first report delay (published July 2021) was during a period when public discussion of COVIDSafe effectiveness was still active, but the app's poor performance became clearer only after publication. By the time reports were published, the app was becoming obsolete anyway due to changing pandemic circumstances [22].

4. COVIDSafe Was Decommissioned:
The app was permanently shut down in 2021 [23]. This means the statutory requirement for ongoing 6-monthly reports eventually became moot, as there was no longer an app to report on. The government's final report (March 2023) dealt with decommissioning rather than ongoing operation [24].

5. Parliamentary Context:
Multiple inquiries were conducted into COVIDSafe effectiveness:

  • Senate COVID-19 Committee inquiries [25]
  • Parliamentary Health Committee review [26]
    These provided some oversight, though they did not substitute for the statutory reporting requirement [27].

Source Credibility Assessment

The source provided is:

The New Daily - An online news publication with a generally progressive editorial stance. The article focuses on the cost and ineffectiveness of COVIDSafe, using government data to make its case [28]. While The New Daily has a clear political perspective, the underlying claims about COVIDSafe's cost and effectiveness are drawn from official government sources and published reports [29].

Credibility Assessment: The New Daily is a credible source for factual information when it sources claims from official documents, but readers should note its editorial perspective. The claim about "breaking the law" reflects an interpretation that the reporting delays constituted legal breach—a reasonable interpretation but one that required legal expertise to substantiate [30].

Important Note: The claim's factual basis is stronger than a single opinion piece. The requirement for 6-monthly reports is in the legislation itself, and the delays are documented in parliamentary records and media reports of government disclosures [31].

⚖️

Labor Comparison

Did Labor do something similar?

Search conducted: "Labor government statutory reporting requirements compliance Parliament"

Finding: No equivalent case of comparable statutory breach has been identified in recent Labor government history [32].

Labor's Approach to COVIDSafe:

  • As opposition, Labor called for faster release of COVIDSafe effectiveness reports in 2021 [33]
  • After gaining office in May 2022, Labor continued the app decommissioning process initiated by Coalition [34]
  • The final decommissioning report (March 2023, tabled by Labor government) suggests Labor complied with the statutory requirement when it had the power to do so [35]

Context: This is not a pattern common across governments. The specific breach reflects a failure to meet a specific statutory deadline, not a general practice. Labor's handling suggests it did not maintain the same pattern of delays [36].

🌐

Balanced Perspective

Why the Government Delays Might Be Defensible (Though Not Legally Excused)

  1. Report Content Sensitivity:
    The reports revealed the app's spectacular failure to identify cases. The government may have delayed release to avoid embarrassment or to time announcements strategically [37]. This is understandable as a political matter, but does not excuse missing a statutory deadline.

  2. COVID-19 Operational Demands:
    In 2020-2021, health departments were under enormous strain managing the pandemic response. Report writing might have been deprioritized [38]. Again, this is understandable as context but doesn't excuse a legal breach.

  3. The App Was Becoming Obsolete:
    By the time of delays, COVIDSafe was increasingly irrelevant as vaccination and immunity reduced transmission tracking importance [39]. The government's implicit logic may have been "why rush to publish negative reports about a dying app?" This reflects poor legal judgment, not legal justification.

  4. No Public Harm (Arguably):
    The delayed reports did not prevent the public from eventually learning of COVIDSafe's ineffectiveness. By 2023, the ineffectiveness was well-documented in media and research [40]. The delay did not permanently conceal the information.

Why These Defenses Don't Override the Legal Requirement

Despite these contextual factors, the statutory requirement was clear and unambiguous:

  1. Parliament Set a Specific Deadline:
    The 15-sitting-day requirement was explicit in the legislation [41]. The government cannot excuse missing a statutory deadline by claiming operational pressure.

  2. The Delay Exceeded Reasonable Timeframes:
    Missing deadlines by 7-9 months is not a minor slip. It suggests systemic failure to comply, not bureaucratic inadvertence [42].

  3. The Reports Contained Important Public Information:
    The reports revealed that COVIDSafe cost $21 million and identified effectively zero cases that contact tracing wouldn't have found [43]. This information should have been published promptly under the statutory deadline.

  4. The Pattern Appears Deliberate:
    If the delays were inadvertent, they might be excused. The InnovationAus reporting that the government was "forced to release" reports suggests deliberate withholding rather than inadvertent delay [44].

PARTIALLY TRUE

6.5

out of 10

The claim's core assertion—that the government "broke their own law by not conducting reports"—is somewhat misleading because it implies no reports were produced. This is inaccurate. However, the underlying truth is that the government missed statutory deadlines for tabling these reports by months or years [45].

More Precise Verdict:

  • ✅ Statutory 6-monthly reporting requirement existed [46]
  • ✅ Reports were conducted [47]
  • ✅ Reports were missed statutory tabling deadlines [48]
  • ⚠️ No formal legal proceeding or court finding of breach documented [49]

The claim would be more accurate as: "The government failed to meet statutory deadlines for tabling COVIDSafe effectiveness reports, missing deadlines by 7-9 months, thereby violating the Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act 2020."

This is essentially what the claim alleges, but with more precision about the nature of the breach (timing, not non-production) and acknowledging that while technically a breach, it was not prosecuted as a legal matter.

Rating Scale Methodology

1-3: FALSE

Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.

4-6: PARTIAL

Some truth but context is missing or skewed.

7-9: MOSTLY TRUE

Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.

10: ACCURATE

Perfectly verified and contextually fair.

Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.