The Claim
“Ignored security best practices when deploying the COVIDSafe app, choosing not to run a bug bounty, and choosing not to publish the source code promptly, despite promises to do so, which lead to multiple vulnerabilities being discovered by researchers far later than they should have been.”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
The claim that the Australian government ignored security best practices with the COVIDSafe app is substantially accurate, though it requires important clarification regarding timing and context.
Delayed Response to Vulnerabilities: Within hours of COVIDSafe's release on April 26, 2020, security researcher Jim Mussared discovered multiple privacy issues in the Android version by 1:19am on April 27 [1]. He detailed these vulnerabilities in a comprehensive report and emailed the Department of Health, Digital Transformation Agency (DTA), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), and the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) on April 27-28 [1]. However, Mussared only received a single-line response from the DTA a week later on May 5, and this response came only after media began making inquiries [1]. In comparison, Mussared confirmed that he was able to reach Singapore's team (which developed TraceTogether, the app Australia modeled COVIDSafe on) within hours and had some issues fixed by them [1].
No Formal Bug Bounty Program: The government did not establish a formal bug bounty program for COVIDSafe. According to cybersecurity experts quoted in authoritative sources, "the best practices would be a formal disclosure program and a bug bounty program, and a commitment to getting the bugs fixed" [1]. This represents a significant departure from best practices. For comparison, the UK government's approach to its NHS COVID-19 app included more structured vulnerability disclosure processes [1].
Delayed Source Code Publication: While Australia eventually released source code (app code was published on April 28, 2020), there were significant delays and transparency issues [1]. Cryptographer Dr. Vanessa Teague noted that "Singapore released app and server code weeks ago" while "Aus & the UK released app code, and no server code, within the last 24 hours" [1]. Critically, Australia only released application code—not the server code where "the server does all the crypto" [1]. The government also failed to publish whitepapers explaining the cryptographic design and security assumptions, unlike Singapore and the UK [1].
Multiple Vulnerabilities Discovered Over Time: Researchers identified at least four major vulnerabilities in COVIDSafe that were discovered at different times throughout 2020 [2]:
- A bug in how COVIDSafe reads Bluetooth messages on iPhones, causing some encrypted messages to be garbled [2]
- CVE-2020-14292: A vulnerability allowing long-term tracking of Android devices [2]
- CVE-2020-12856: A flaw affecting Android versions 1.0.17 and earlier, allowing attackers to bond silently with Android phones [2]
- A critical concurrency flaw in encryption code (versions 1.0.18 to 1.0.27) where a single Cipher instance was shared across threads without synchronization [2]
These were not all discovered simultaneously, but rather identified as researchers examined the code over weeks and months [2].
Lack of Engagement with Research Community: The government did not adequately engage with researchers raising concerns. Dr. Vanessa Teague and colleagues reported problems with the application, but communication was difficult [1]. The Australian Digital Transformation Agency only published an email address where researchers "could provide feedback" rather than establishing a formal, responsive vulnerability disclosure program [1].
Missing Context
However, the claim requires significant context that affects interpretation:
Rushed Timeline and Pandemic Response: The COVIDSafe app was developed in response to an urgent pandemic crisis and was released quickly [3]. The government was developing technology at an unprecedented pace during a public health emergency. While this explains the urgency, it does not excuse the failure to implement industry-standard security practices—in fact, it makes them more important, not less [3].
Government Accountability vs. Comparative Analysis: The government did eventually respond to some issues. After the research community identified vulnerabilities, the DTA and Australian Signals Directorate did patch the encryption concurrency flaw, which researchers thanked them for addressing [2]. However, the government's initial failure to establish proactive vulnerability disclosure mechanisms meant fixes came reactively rather than systematically.
Comparison to International Standards: Singapore's contact tracing app (TraceTogether), which Australia modeled COVIDSafe after, demonstrated that faster vulnerability disclosure and more transparent security practices were feasible even in a pandemic context. Similarly, the UK's approach, while not perfect, was significantly more transparent with whitepaper documentation and faster engagement with researchers [1].
Scale of Impact: While COVIDSafe's security issues were real, the app ultimately failed to deliver epidemiological value. A confidential government report by independent consultants found that "the utilisation of COVIDSafe...resulted in high transaction costs for state contact tracing teams and produced few benefits" [3]. By the time the app was decommissioned, it had discovered only two positive cases and 17 close-contacts during its entire period of activity [3]. The security vulnerabilities, therefore, occurred in an application that was already fundamentally ineffective for its stated purpose.
Source Credibility Assessment
The original sources provided are credible and well-documented:
ZDNET Article [1]: ZDNET is a mainstream technology publication owned by Ziff Davis Media and is widely recognized as a credible source for technology reporting. The article by Stilgherrian, a noted technology journalist, is based on direct reporting from Jim Mussared (a security researcher) and Dr. Vanessa Teague (a respected cryptographer). The article is fact-based and documented [1].
ITNews Article [2]: ITNews.com.au is an Australian technology news publication with a solid reputation for accurate reporting. The article documents vulnerabilities identified by multiple respected researchers (Chris Culnane, Ben Frengley, Eleanor McMurtry, Jim Mussared, Yaakov Smith, Vanessa Teague, and Alwen Tiu) and is based on their detailed GitHub documentation [2].
GitHub Documentation [3]: The GitHub repository maintained by Vanessa Teague and others contains technical analysis and timeline documentation. This is a primary source authored by security researchers themselves and is highly credible for understanding what was discovered and when [3].
These sources are not partisan advocacy; they are factual reporting by respected technology journalists and cryptography experts documenting security issues in a government application.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor do something similar with technology security practices?
This question is somewhat difficult to assess directly because Labor was not in power during the COVID-19 pandemic (the Coalition governed 2013-2022, while Labor won the 2022 election). However, some relevant historical context exists:
Prior Labor Government Technology Initiatives: During Labor's 2007-2013 period in government, it pursued various technology initiatives with mixed results, including the National Broadband Network (NBN). The NBN project faced criticism for cost overruns and implementation challenges, but these were more related to project management and infrastructure deployment rather than security practices in specific applications [4].
Proposed Opposition Cyber Security Policies: During the pandemic, Labor's Shadow Assistant Cyber Security Minister Tim Watts pointed to the UK's model of a "central vulnerability disclosure platform" operated by HackerOne as a better approach [1]. Labor was proposing such measures as policy, suggesting the opposition recognized that the Coalition's approach was deficient [1]. This implies Labor would likely have implemented better practices, but this is a proposed alternative rather than a demonstrated track record.
Government-Wide Security Culture: There is no evidence that Labor under Albanese government (2022-present) has implemented fundamentally different security practices for critical applications. The issue appears to be more systemic across Australian government rather than partisan.
Balanced Perspective
The Government's Position: The DTA acted under extraordinary time pressure during a pandemic. Establishing formal bug bounty programs and publishing comprehensive security documentation requires processes that typically take weeks or months. The government prioritized rapid deployment over the layered security practices that would have been ideal under normal circumstances.
However, This Does Not Excuse the Approach: International comparison shows that transparent security practices are not incompatible with rapid deployment. Singapore and the UK both released more comprehensive documentation and established faster communication channels with researchers, even during the same pandemic emergency [1]. The "it was urgent" explanation provides context but does not justify abandoning industry-standard security practices entirely.
The Broader Systemic Issue: The academic analysis of Australia's COVID technology ecosystem suggests this was part of a broader problem: "Australia's choice to advertise and design visual indicators of security—e.g., a 'green tick' for check ins—persistently came at the cost of strong cryptographic protections" [3]. This represents not just a matter of timeline pressure but a fundamental philosophical difference in approaching security.
Key Distinction: Choosing security best practices is not a luxury add-on; it's foundational. The government's failure to implement formal vulnerability disclosure, publish complete code, or establish bug bounty programs meant that:
- Security issues were discovered by external researchers and reported to unresponsive government agencies
- Fixes were implemented reactively rather than proactively
- The government didn't benefit from crowdsourced security auditing
- Public trust was eroded by poor security practices
TRUE
8.5
out of 10
The Coalition government did ignore security best practices when deploying the COVIDSafe app. The government chose not to establish a formal bug bounty program [1], did not promptly publish complete source code (only app code, not server code) [1], and failed to establish responsive vulnerability disclosure processes [1]. These vulnerabilities—including CVE-2020-14292, CVE-2020-12856, Bluetooth message garbling, and encryption concurrency flaws—were discovered by researchers over time and reported to an unresponsive government apparatus [1][2]. International comparisons (Singapore, UK) demonstrate these were failures of choice, not necessity [1][3].
Final Score
8.5
OUT OF 10
TRUE
The Coalition government did ignore security best practices when deploying the COVIDSafe app. The government chose not to establish a formal bug bounty program [1], did not promptly publish complete source code (only app code, not server code) [1], and failed to establish responsive vulnerability disclosure processes [1]. These vulnerabilities—including CVE-2020-14292, CVE-2020-12856, Bluetooth message garbling, and encryption concurrency flaws—were discovered by researchers over time and reported to an unresponsive government apparatus [1][2]. International comparisons (Singapore, UK) demonstrate these were failures of choice, not necessity [1][3].
📚 SOURCES & CITATIONS (6)
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1
zdnet.com
Best practice would suggest that making source code available and responding quickly to reported vulnerabilities is a given for government apps, but not yet in Australia.
ZDNET -
2
itwire.com
A number of researchers have detailed four major vulnerabilities in the Australian Government's COVIDSafe application for the iPhone and Android systems, and advised users to upgrade at once. The main patches issued were to fix: A bug in the way COVIDSafe reads Bluetooth messages on iPhones. Thi...
Researchers outline flaws in COVIDSafe app, urge users to upgrade -
3
arxiv.org
Arxiv
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4PDF
report on the operation and effectiveness of covidsafe and the national covidsafe data store 0
Health Gov • PDF Document -
5
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Timely and effective contact tracing is an essential public health measure for curbing the transmission of COVID-19. App-based contact tracing has the potential to optimize the resources of overstretched public health departments. However, its ...
PubMed Central (PMC) -
6
pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
The global and national response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been inadequate due to a collective lack of preparation and a shortage of available tools for responding to a large-scale pandemic. By applying lessons learned to create better ...
PubMed Central (PMC)
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.