The Claim
“Refused to publish numbers about how many COVID close contacts had been identified by the COVIDSafe app. They said it's the job of state governments to report how many contacts are identified by the federal government's app.”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
The core claim that the federal government refused to publish COVIDSafe contact tracing data is substantially verified. According to the ZDNet article citing the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19, "the federal government has been unwilling to provide an update on how many additional contacts the COVIDSafe app has identified, choosing to instead claim the states and territories are responsible for reporting the number of cases identified" [1].
The Senate committee's final report, released in April 2022, found that between May and November 2020, the COVIDSafe app identified only 17 additional close contacts out of 25,300 total close contacts in New South Wales—representing 0.1% of all close contact detections [1]. A subsequent independent study by UNSW researchers covering the same period found similarly poor performance, with the app detecting only 15% of true close contacts identified through conventional contact tracing, while 61% of contacts the app flagged were not epidemiologically linked to cases [2].
The claim about the government's responsibility-shifting statement is supported by the Senate committee's finding: "the federal government has been unwilling to provide an update on how many additional contacts the COVIDSafe app has identified, choosing to instead claim the states and territories are responsible for reporting the number of cases identified" [1]. This directly confirms the accusation of refusing to publish the numbers and attributing responsibility to state governments.
Missing Context
However, the claim omits several important contextual factors:
The app's minimal operational use: The COVIDSafe app was only used by New South Wales and Victoria, and had extremely limited uptake among Australians. Only 22% of COVID-19 cases were using the app during the study period [2]. This limited use partially explains why it identified so few contacts.
Genuine state-federal responsibility complexity: While the claim frames the federal government's statement as evasion, there is legitimate complexity in contact tracing responsibility. States operate their own contact tracing systems and conduct case interviews. The federal government's point—that states are responsible for reporting what their systems find—has some technical merit, though the government could have more transparently tracked data it did collect.
The app was voluntary: The COVIDSafe app relied on voluntary user participation and Bluetooth proximity detection, which proved technically unreliable. Low uptake was partly because Australians chose not to use it after early skepticism.
Cost and timeline: The app cost $9.2 million by October 2021 [1], but the poor performance became apparent relatively quickly. The government continued funding it despite evidence of failure, which was the more substantive issue than the transparency question.
Source Credibility Assessment
The ZDNet article (original source) is a mainstream Australian technology publication owned by Ziff Davis. Campbell Kwan, the author, is a technology reporter. The article is factual reporting backed by the Senate Select Committee's official findings and independent UNSW research—both highly credible sources. The article appropriately quotes official sources and cites data from peer-reviewed research [2].
The Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 itself had Labor dominance (Labor senators formed the majority), which the ABC article notes in its analysis of the report [3]. Liberal Senator James Paterson and Nationals Senator Perin Davey issued a dissenting statement claiming the committee had been "used as a vehicle in which Labor senators have pursued partisan attacks on the government" [3]. This is relevant context—the committee report, while factually grounded, was produced by a Labor-dominated body and included recommendations aligned with Labor policy positions.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor do something similar?
Under the Rudd/Gillard governments (2007-2013), there was no equivalent national contact tracing app, as mobile technology and pandemic preparedness frameworks were different at that time. Australia's response to pandemic preparedness was largely inherited by the Coalition government in 2013.
However, the broader issue of government transparency around data collection is relevant. Labor has historically advocated for greater transparency in government pandemic responses, which is why Labor senators pushed the COVID-19 committee to examine this issue. This suggests Labor would likely have been more transparent about data collection failure, though we don't have direct precedent since Labor wasn't in government during the pandemic.
The issue of government intransparency around failed programs is not unique to the Coalition—it's a general government tendency. However, the specific refusal to publish COVIDSafe metrics appears to have been distinctive to this app and the Coalition government's handling of it.
Balanced Perspective
While critics argue the government deliberately obscured COVIDSafe's failure to avoid accountability, there are several legitimate contextual points:
The complexity of cross-government data: Contact tracing data lives with state health authorities, not the federal government. The government technically wasn't hiding data it never collected—the data was generated by states conducting interviews. However, the government could have more proactively tracked and published the limited data it did have about the app's actual performance.
The real problem was continued funding, not transparency: The more substantive criticism isn't whether the government published data—it's that the government continued funding an app it knew was ineffective. The Senate committee's key recommendation was to "cease any future expenditure of public funds on the failed COVIDSafe application" [1], not just to publish historical data.
Responsibility-shifting was technically defensible but poorly communicated: The government's statement that states are responsible for reporting contacts detected through their systems has some validity. Contact tracing is a state responsibility in the Australian federal system. However, the government could have been more proactive in aggregating and publishing what little data existed about the app's performance.
Independent research filled the gap: UNSW researchers independently studied the app's effectiveness and published peer-reviewed findings showing 0.1% contact detection rate [2]. Academic research and the Senate committee ultimately provided the transparency the government didn't.
Key context: This is not unique to the Coalition—most governments are reluctant to publicize failed programs. However, the specific dynamic where a federal government funds an app but then claims responsibility for publishing effectiveness data belongs to the state is somewhat distinctive. The more notable issue is that the government funded a clearly ineffective app for years despite mounting evidence of failure.
TRUE
7.0
out of 10
The federal government did refuse to publish COVIDSafe contact identification numbers and did attribute responsibility to state governments. However, the claim simplifies a more complex federal-state issue and omits that the real problem was continued funding despite proven ineffectiveness, not just transparency.
Final Score
7.0
OUT OF 10
TRUE
The federal government did refuse to publish COVIDSafe contact identification numbers and did attribute responsibility to state governments. However, the claim simplifies a more complex federal-state issue and omits that the real problem was continued funding despite proven ineffectiveness, not just transparency.
📚 SOURCES & CITATIONS (5)
-
1
Senate committee calls for funding of failed COVIDSafe app to be dropped
From May to November 2020, the COVIDSafe app chipped in 0.1% of all close contact detections in New South Wales.
ZDNET -
2
The COVIDSafe app was designed to help contact tracers. We crunched the numbers to see what really happened
Unsw Edu
-
3
Key takeaways from Senate COVID-19 committee final report
From lockdowns, to the international border closure and the vaccine rollout, a Senate committee has been scrutinising the government's response to COVID-19 since the start of the pandemic. Here are some of the main points from its final report.
Abc Net -
4
The COVIDSafe app was designed to help contact tracers. We crunched the numbers to see what really happened
Instead of making the lives of contact tracers easier, analysis shows the expensive technology missed contacts and added to their workload.
The Conversation -
5PDF
Report on the operation and effectiveness of COVIDSafe and the National COVIDSafe Data Store
Health Gov • PDF Document
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.