The Coalition government did substantially increase spending through contracts that bypassed competitive tender processes, though the claim's framing requires important qualification.
**Limited Tender and Non-Competitive Spending:**
According to Department of Finance procurement statistics, limited tender (non-competitive) contracts have been a persistent feature of Australian government procurement [1].
However, this figure represents spending ACROSS THE ENTIRE YEAR, not per month as the claim suggests [2].
**The $34 Billion Figure - Clarification:**
The specific "$34 billion per month" appears to reference data analyzed by data expert Greg Bean, who identified $34 billion in "amended contracts" in August (year not specified in available sources, likely 2022) [3].
Additionally, when analyzed separately, limited tender contracts alone do not average $34 billion monthly [2].
**Specific Cases of Non-Competitive Awards:**
- **Great Barrier Reef Foundation (2018):** $443 million awarded without competitive tender to a then-small, previously obscure organisation [4]
- **Australian Future Leaders Program:** $18 million allocated without tender to a charity that reportedly had no staff, website, or office at the time [4]
- Both cases were criticized by Transparency International as examples of non-competitive processes creating "breeding grounds for potential corruption" [4]
**Misreporting and Compliance Issues:**
An ANAO examination of Commonwealth procurement found significant compliance failures.
Of 155 contracts reported as limited tender, 29% (45 contracts) were actually misreported—meaning they should have been subject to open tender requirements but were not properly classified [5].
Emergency and Defense Spending:**
A substantial portion of the non-competitive spending spike relates to defense procurement and COVID-19 emergency response.
Under Commonwealth Procurement Rules, exemptions are lawful when "necessary to protect human health" or when extreme urgency precludes competitive processes [6].
Similarly, amended defense contracts (particularly for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program) account for $57.7 billion of the $81 billion identified in amended contracts [3], and these amendments typically relate to long-term capability maintenance rather than new discretionary spending [3].
**2.
Contractual Mechanisms:**
Government contracts often include pre-agreed mechanisms for amendments and additional purchases.
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Request for Tender documents typically contain provisions governing how amendments can be made, and draft contracts often include options for additional goods/services that are later reported as amendments rather than entirely new contracts [3].
Timeframe Ambiguity:**
The "$34 billion per month" figure appears to reference a specific month (August, likely 2022) rather than a sustained monthly average.
Without clarification of whether this spike was temporary or sustained, the claim's implication of "drastically increased" ongoing spending is misleading.
However, Michael West Media self-identifies as progressively oriented and strongly critical of government and corporate power—a left-leaning editorial perspective [8].
然而 rán ér , , Michael Michael West West Media Media 自我 zì wǒ 認定 rèn dìng 為 wèi 進步 jìn bù 取向 qǔ xiàng , , 並強烈 bìng qiáng liè 批評 pī píng 政府 zhèng fǔ 和 hé 企業 qǐ yè 權力 quán lì — — — — 具有 jù yǒu 左翼 zuǒ yì 編輯 biān jí 視角 shì jiǎo [ [ 8 8 ] ] 。 。
The publication maintains good factual standards but frames investigations with advocacy-oriented language ("bomb," "explodes") that interprets data through a critical lens [8].
**Assessment:** While Michael West's underlying data about procurement spending is generally accurate, the publication's editorial framing emphasizes the negative interpretation without equally emphasizing legal exemptions, emergency contexts, or comparative analysis.
The original source provides valuable raw data but interprets it through a particular political lens.
**Data Accuracy of Cited Figures:**
The $34 billion and $81 billion figures referenced in Michael West's reporting can be traced to analysis by data expert Greg Bean [3].
These figures are documented in government procurement data, though their interpretation as corruption/improper spending requires additional context [3].
**Did Labor do something similar?**
Search conducted: "Labor government spending tender exemptions Australia" and "Labor government procurement limited tender"
**Finding:**
Historical Labor government procurement data shows different patterns.
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From 2007-2013 (when Labor was in government), limited tender represented a different proportion of overall procurement, though exact year-by-year comparisons are limited in available sources [9].
Crucially, the data available shows that limited tender as a PERCENTAGE of all contracts actually DECREASED from 53% (2012-13, end of Labor government) to 45% (2021-22, during Coalition period) [9].
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This suggests that while absolute dollar amounts may have increased due to overall growth in government spending, the proportion of non-competitive contracts was not increasing under the Coalition relative to the final Labor period [9].
**However**, Labor's recent procurement reforms (implemented in 2024-2025) included new requirements for open tendering below $125,000, specifically to address concerns about limited tender abuse [10].
This indicates that both parties have acknowledged procurement transparency as a concern, and Labor addressed it through legislative reform rather than maintaining the prior practice [10].
**Key distinction:** The available evidence does not support a claim that the Coalition was uniquely problematic in non-competitive tendering.
Both Labor and Coalition governments have used limited tender provisions, though the Coalition period saw absolute dollar increases (likely due to overall budget increases and emergency spending) rather than a systematic shift toward non-competitive procurement.
The Coalition did:
- Award significant contracts without competitive tender (GBR Foundation, Future Leaders program)
- Oversee a period when limited tender contracts reached $33-34 billion annually
- Fail to adequately prevent agencies from misclassifying contracts that should have required competitive tender [5]
- Create opportunities for potential conflicts of interest through non-competitive awarding (as identified by Transparency International) [4]
These practices warrant scrutiny and represent legitimate concerns about government accountability and value-for-money in public spending.
**Legitimate Explanations and Mitigating Context:**
Simultaneously, important context applies:
1. **Legal Exemptions:** Non-competitive procurement is lawfully permitted under Commonwealth Procurement Rules for emergencies, sole-supplier situations, and contracts below monetary thresholds [6]
2. **Emergency Response:** A significant portion of the spike relates to necessary COVID-19 health procurement and urgent defense capability maintenance [6]
3. **Overall Percentage:** Despite absolute dollar increases, limited tender as a proportion of overall government procurement actually decreased during the Coalition period compared to the preceding Labor government [9]
4. **Investigative Oversight:** ANAO conducted compliance audits identifying problematic practices, indicating that accountability mechanisms exist and were being applied [5]
5. **Current Reform:** Labor's government has implemented more stringent procurement rules (2024-2025), acknowledging that reforms were needed, but this affects both current and future practice [10]
**Expert Analysis:**
While some forms of non-competitive procurement are legitimate and necessary, ANAO's finding that 29% of limited tender contracts were misreported indicates systemic compliance problems [5].
Coalition Coalition 確實 què shí : :
This suggests the issue is not whether non-competitive procurement exists (it does, legitimately), but whether proper controls are applied to ensure it's used only where justified [5].
**Key Context:** Non-competitive government procurement is a practice across developed democracies and across Australian political parties.
The Coalition period saw increased absolute spending on limited tender contracts, but this appears driven primarily by emergency spending (COVID-19) and baseline budget increases rather than a deliberate policy shift away from competitive tendering.
Implying "$34 billion per month" as a sustained regular figure when evidence suggests it was a spike in a specific month (likely August 2022), primarily in amended contracts rather than new awards
2.
Implying this was uniquely a Coalition problem when both parties have used non-competitive tendering, and Labor's final year showed similar proportional rates
The more accurate characterization: The Coalition government did award significant contracts without competitive tender, including questionable cases (GBR Foundation, Future Leaders) that warrant criticism.
However, the largest spending increases identified relate to lawful emergency exemptions and contract amendments rather than systematic non-competitive corruption.
然而 rán ér , , 確定 què dìng 的 de 最大 zuì dà 支出 zhī chū 增加 zēng jiā 與 yǔ 合法 hé fǎ 的 de 緊急 jǐn jí 豁免 huò miǎn 和 hé 合同 hé tóng 修訂 xiū dìng 相關 xiāng guān , , 而 ér 非系 fēi xì 統性 tǒng xìng 的 de 非 fēi 競爭性 jìng zhēng xìng 腐敗 fǔ bài 。 。
The claim's use of "drastically increased...up to $34 billion per month" creates an exaggerated impression of ongoing monthly non-competitive spending.
Implying "$34 billion per month" as a sustained regular figure when evidence suggests it was a spike in a specific month (likely August 2022), primarily in amended contracts rather than new awards
2.
Implying this was uniquely a Coalition problem when both parties have used non-competitive tendering, and Labor's final year showed similar proportional rates
The more accurate characterization: The Coalition government did award significant contracts without competitive tender, including questionable cases (GBR Foundation, Future Leaders) that warrant criticism.
However, the largest spending increases identified relate to lawful emergency exemptions and contract amendments rather than systematic non-competitive corruption.
然而 rán ér , , 確定 què dìng 的 de 最大 zuì dà 支出 zhī chū 增加 zēng jiā 與 yǔ 合法 hé fǎ 的 de 緊急 jǐn jí 豁免 huò miǎn 和 hé 合同 hé tóng 修訂 xiū dìng 相關 xiāng guān , , 而 ér 非系 fēi xì 統性 tǒng xìng 的 de 非 fēi 競爭性 jìng zhēng xìng 腐敗 fǔ bài 。 。
The claim's use of "drastically increased...up to $34 billion per month" creates an exaggerated impression of ongoing monthly non-competitive spending.