In the September 2020 Federal Budget, the Coalition government allocated $256.6 million to develop the Commonwealth Digital Identity Program (then called "myGovID"), as part of the broader $800 million JobMaker Digital Business Plan economic recovery package [1][2].
However, this funding was not allocated "just" for facial recognition as a login option—it covers a comprehensive digital identity system with multiple components [3].
该 gāi 计划 jì huà 包括 bāo kuò : :
The program includes:
- Facial recognition (voluntary, one of multiple authentication methods)
- Fingerprint recognition
- Passkey/passwordless authentication (FIDO2 standard)
- Digital identity verification infrastructure
- Fraud prevention and anti-scam capabilities
- Integration capability across 130+ government services
- Backend security and data infrastructure [1][2][3]
Importantly, facial recognition is **optional**.
Users can authenticate using fingerprint, passkeys (PIN/biometric screen lock), physical security keys, or—for legacy systems—traditional passwords [4].
- - 指纹识别 zhǐ wén shí bié
As of 2023-2024, the government has actively promoted passwordless passkey authentication as the preferred method, moving away from facial recognition as a primary authentication mechanism [5].
According to government announcements and policy documents, the primary purpose was to establish a **national digital identity system for fraud prevention and service delivery modernization** [1][2].
Second, the $256.6 million was part of a larger pandemic-response economic stimulus package (JobMaker Digital Business Plan), not a standalone facial recognition project.
The broader context was modernizing government IT infrastructure during the COVID-19 pandemic, when demand for online government services surged [1][3].
The voluntary nature of the system and the availability of non-facial alternatives (fingerprint, passkeys, traditional methods) are significant omissions that affect the claim's fairness [4].
Finally, the claim omits that digital identity systems had become standard practice across OECD nations by 2020, with most developed democracies implementing similar programs [5].
This was not a uniquely controversial Coalition initiative but part of an international trend [5].
来源可信度评估
* * * * The The New New Daily Daily ( ( 2020 2020 年 nián 9 9 月 yuè 30 30 日 rì 文章 wén zhāng ) ) : : * * * *
**The New Daily (September 30, 2020 article):**
The New Daily is an Australian news and opinion website founded in 2012.
The The New New Daily Daily 是 shì 一家 yī jiā 成立 chéng lì 于 yú 2012 2012 年 nián 的 de 澳大利亚 ào dà lì yà 新闻 xīn wén 和 hé 评论 píng lùn 网站 wǎng zhàn 。 。
It describes itself as providing "news and analysis for Australians." On Media Bias/Fact Check, The New Daily is rated as having "High" factuality (accurate reporting) but leans editorially toward left-of-center criticism of Coalition policies [6].
The specific article uses accurate figures and includes commentary from privacy researchers and technology experts, but employs clear editorial framing emphasizing concerns about the system.
The overall tone is skeptical rather than balanced [6].
**Seven News (7News):**
Seven News is the news division of Seven Network Limited, one of Australia's major television broadcasters established in 1956.
Seven News provides credible reporting but may frame stories to emphasize particular angles.
**Assessment:** Both sources are credible on factual reporting (the $256 million figure is correct), but both employ editorial framing critical of the facial recognition policy.
Neither source is disreputable, but both should be understood as having particular editorial perspectives rather than providing fully neutral analysis [6][7].
**Did Labor stop or oppose this program?**
The Australian Labor government did **not** oppose or cancel the digital identity program when it came to power in May 2022 [8].
* * * *
Instead, Labor **continued and expanded** the program:
- Labor **rebranded** myGovID to "myID" in October 2024, continuing the same underlying technology [8]
- **Increased funding** to approximately $580 million AUD over four years (2024-2028) for further expansion [8]
- **Added new authentication methods**, including passwordless passkey authentication [8]
- **Expanded the rollout** to additional government and state services [8]
- **Moved forward** with plans for whole-of-economy digital identity expansion [9]
**Labor's historical position:**
During the Coalition government's tenure (2013-2022), Labor's Shadow Cabinet did not campaign against or propose canceling the digital identity program.
While individual Labor MPs raised privacy concerns (as did some Coalition backbenchers), Labor's policy position did not fundamentally oppose the initiative [9].
**International context:**
Digital identity systems with biometric authentication are standard in advanced democracies:
- Estonia (2002, digital ID with biometric components)
- Singapore (national digital identity system)
- The UK (explored, delayed due to privacy concerns)
- The US (Real ID Act, state-level implementations)
- The EU (eIDAS regulation) [5]
This indicates the program was not unique to the Coalition or particularly partisan—both parties and most developed democracies support some form of digital identity infrastructure [5][9].
**Criticisms of the program (valid concerns):**
Critics raised legitimate objections to the facial recognition program [10][11]:
1. **Privacy risks** - Centralized storage of facial biometric data creates potential breach risk
2. **Algorithmic bias** - Facial recognition systems are documented to have reduced accuracy for people with darker skin tones [10]
3. **Access barriers** - The system could exclude vulnerable Australians without reliable technology or access
4. **Vendor lock-in concerns** - Deloitte's contract for implementation cost increased from $9.5 million to $28 million in 6 months, raising cost control questions [11]
5. **Scope creep** - Movement toward whole-of-economy digital ID raises surveillance concerns [12]
6. **Data security** - Large-scale biometric databases are attractive targets for cyber attacks [11]
These concerns are **legitimate policy arguments** independent of whether the specific spending claim is accurate.
**Government justification and counterarguments:**
The government's stated rationale for the program [2][13]:
1. **Fraud prevention** - Digital identity verification reduces identity fraud and welfare fraud, protecting legitimate beneficiaries
2. **Service efficiency** - Reduces paperwork, improves processing times for government services
3. **Pandemic necessity** - During COVID-19, online-only service access created urgent need for secure digital authentication
4. **Voluntary participation** - Users choose to use the system; traditional authentication methods remain available
5. **Multiple options** - Facial recognition is one option among several (fingerprint, passkeys, etc.), not the only method
6. **International standard** - Most developed democracies implement similar digital identity systems; Australia was catching up
7. **Security standards** - The system was designed to meet international security standards (ISO 27001, IRAP) [2]
**Expert opinion:**
Technology and policy experts offered mixed views:
- Privacy organizations expressed concerns about scope and safeguards [10]
- Cybersecurity experts acknowledged legitimate data security risks [11]
- Government efficiency analysts noted potential service delivery improvements [2]
- International digital governance experts noted Australia was implementing similar systems to peer nations [5]
**Key context:** This is not unique to the Coalition.
The legitimate debate is about safeguards, privacy protections, and implementation details—not whether digital identity systems themselves should exist [8][9].
The claim states the money was spent "just to add facial recognition as a login option," but the actual allocation was for a comprehensive digital identity system that includes facial recognition as one voluntary authentication method alongside fingerprint recognition, passkeys, and traditional authentication [1][2][3][4].
The system also serves purposes beyond login—including identity fraud prevention, document verification, and integration across 130+ government services [1][3].
The claim omits the voluntary nature of facial recognition, the availability of alternative authentication methods, the broader pandemic context, and the fact that both Coalition and Labor governments supported the program [8].
While legitimate privacy and security concerns exist regarding the program [10][11], these are separate from whether the spending claim itself is accurate or fairly characterized.
The claim states the money was spent "just to add facial recognition as a login option," but the actual allocation was for a comprehensive digital identity system that includes facial recognition as one voluntary authentication method alongside fingerprint recognition, passkeys, and traditional authentication [1][2][3][4].
The system also serves purposes beyond login—including identity fraud prevention, document verification, and integration across 130+ government services [1][3].
The claim omits the voluntary nature of facial recognition, the availability of alternative authentication methods, the broader pandemic context, and the fact that both Coalition and Labor governments supported the program [8].
While legitimate privacy and security concerns exist regarding the program [10][11], these are separate from whether the spending claim itself is accurate or fairly characterized.