Here are the key findings:
**Coalition purchases under the Emissions Reduction Fund:**
The Coalition government did indeed purchase carbon credits through its $4.5 billion Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) [1].
The scheme paid landowners for projects, including Human-Induced Regeneration (HIR) - the most popular method for creating carbon credits, under which landholders were paid to allow native forests to regenerate [2].
**The "existing trees" allegation:**
Professor Andrew Macintosh, the former chair of the Emissions Reduction Assurance Committee, led research that analyzed 119 HIR projects in New South Wales and Queensland.
His team found that "despite the government issuing 17.5m carbon credits to these projects – with each credit meant to represent one tonne of carbon dioxide absorbed by growing trees – the total forest area had barely increased" [3].
For 59 of the projects analyzed, the amount of forest was found to have reduced, yet they still received 8.2m carbon credits worth more than $100m [3].
Macintosh claimed that credits were "being issued for growing trees despite in many cases already containing mature trees when the projects started" and that "the rules require areas with mature trees to be excluded" [4].
His analysis suggested over 80% of HIR projects were "performing badly," with tree cover having either "gone nowhere or gone backwards" [5].
**Value of carbon credits disputed:**
Macintosh claimed approximately $1 billion in public money had been wasted and that the government bought "credits for growing trees that are already there" [6].
This aligns with the claim's assertion of "hundreds of millions" being paid for pre-existing trees, though the quantum is debated.
**Total contracted value:**
Landholders using the HIR method have signed contracts with the government worth an estimated $1.5 billion, though not all of this represents payments for carbon credits already issued [1].
**The contested nature of the analysis:**
The Clean Energy Regulator disputed Macintosh's findings, stating that "previous statistical material provided by Prof Macintosh has not been substantiated following investigation" [7].
The regulator commissioned independent analysis by Beare and Chambers, which found that "the report's statement... has been misinterpreted to mean that vegetation cover or sequestration is going backwards" [7].
The Beare and Chambers analysis concluded that "forest cover attainment as a result of HIR projects has been positive in both NSW and Queensland and is exceeding expectations" [7].
**The difference between "not growing as expected" and "already there":**
A crucial distinction exists between mature trees that were already present and tree growth that is simply progressing more slowly than modeled.
The CER notes that "only CEAs (Carbon Estimation Areas) are eligible for crediting abatement in the form of ACCUs" and that "Prof Macintosh does not have access to the CEA areas and the legislation prevents that data from being released" [7].
This transparency gap makes independent verification difficult.
**Peer-reviewed support for concerns:**
The Australian Academy of Science review commissioned by the Chubb panel found "a risk the human-induced regeneration method is crediting vegetation change brought on by rainfall, rather than project activities" [8].
This suggests complexity beyond simple "already existing" trees—environmental factors may be responsible for vegetation changes not attributable to project management.
**Auditing and compliance:**
The CER points out that "all ERF HIR projects must undergo at least 3 audits" and that "if trees are not growing according to modelled growth paths, crediting can be suspended until tree growth catches up" [7].
However, it is important to note that Macintosh's credentials as "whistleblower" should be contextualized: he served on the Emissions Reduction Assurance Committee that reviewed and signed off on the HIR method for over six years before resigning [1].
The article notes he "regretted he had not taken a stronger stance on some issues" and had limited success addressing problems while on the committee [1].
**ANU academic papers (March 2022):**
These papers are from academic researchers at the Australian National University (ANU), a reputable institution.
Academic papers on contested policy issues may reflect genuine scholarly concerns but should not be treated as definitive without peer evaluation and government response.
**Clean Energy Regulator response:**
The CER is the government agency responsible for administering the scheme and therefore has an institutional interest in defending it.
A potential conflict of interest exists, as the CER both designs the rules and implements them [10].
**Chubb Review (2023):**
Former Chief Scientist Ian Chubb led an independent review commissioned by the Albanese government in 2023.
However, Chubb's own panel acknowledged concerns: "We saw enough good HIR projects to say that you wouldn't just wave your arm and cancel them all" [12]—implying some projects had significant problems.
**Australian Academy of Science findings:**
The Academy's review found genuine flaws in the HIR methodology, including risks related to rainfall attribution and baseline issues with landfill gas methods [8].
**Labor's previous carbon policy approach:**
Labor's Rudd/Gillard governments (2007-2013) pursued a different climate policy model: the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), which was a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme proposed to commence in 2010 [13].
Neither of these Labor-era policies involved paying landowners for regrowing trees as their primary climate mechanism.
**Labor's approach under Albanese (2022-):**
After returning to government in 2022, the Labor government commissioned the Chubb Review of carbon credits (the scheme they inherited from the Coalition) and accepted its recommendations [11].
Importantly, Labor accepted reforms rather than abolishing the scheme.
**No direct Labor equivalent found:**
There is no evidence that Labor implemented an equivalent scheme during their 2007-2013 government period that involved paying landowners "hundreds of millions" for pre-existing trees.
The Rudd-Gillard approach focused on broad-based emissions trading rather than targeted land management incentives.
**Comparative context:**
The carbon credit scheme was introduced under the Coalition government (post-2015) as their alternative to Labor's carbon tax.
When Labor returned to power in 2022, rather than dismantling the entire scheme, the government reformed it—suggesting both major parties view some form of carbon offsetting as necessary for climate policy.
His argument—that the regulator prioritizes "building an abundant supply of cheap offsets over ensuring their integrity"—reflects a plausible institutional pressure, particularly given the government's commitment to purchasing $1.5bn worth of credits [1].
The Academy of Science review independently identified credible flaws: HIR credits may reflect rainfall-driven vegetation change rather than project activities; landfill gas credits are sometimes issued for activities that would happen anyway [8].
These are technical integrity problems, not just partisan allegations.
**The case for the scheme:**
The Clean Energy Regulator's response provides substantive rebuttals.
The CER notes that:
- Projects use rigorous GIS and "big data" analysis, not simple satellite imagery [7]
- All projects undergo at least 3 independent audits [7]
- Credits are suspended if actual tree growth doesn't match models [7]
- Only 8 of 123 projects assessed by Beare and Chambers showed potential non-compliance [7]
- The Beare and Chambers peer-reviewed analysis found positive overall forest cover outcomes in NSW and Queensland [7]
Importantly, the CER's defense suggests that Macintosh's "satellites show no trees" analysis may not account for the complexity of carbon accounting rules and the difference between visible forest and eligible carbon estimation areas [7].
**The legitimate policy rationale:**
The HIR method was designed to incentivize land managers to change practices (reduce grazing, prevent clearing) to allow forest regeneration.
This reflects the Coalition government's "direct action" climate philosophy: rather than a carbon tax or cap-and-trade, use targeted incentives for specific behaviors [15].
Whether this works better than Labor's broader carbon pricing approach remains contested among climate economists.
**Key context on governance:**
The Chubb Review acknowledged real governance problems: it recommended reducing the Clean Energy Regulator's dual role in designing rules and issuing credits [11].
The current Labor government accepted this recommendation, suggesting even supporters recognize the governance structure required reform.
**The "already there" allegation specifics:**
While Macintosh alleged credits for "growing trees that are already there," the technical dispute centers on:
1.
Whether rainfall-driven vegetation change should count as project-attributable abatement
These are real questions about additionality and methodology—not simple fraud—though they do undermine claimed carbon outcomes.
The Coalition government did pay hundreds of millions in carbon credits (through contracts worth $1.5bn total) for HIR projects, including some that involved property already containing trees [1][3][6].
However, the claim oversimplifies the controversy:
- Macintosh's allegation that credits went for "trees already there" is better described as credits for forests with existing mature trees where additional regeneration was claimed [3][4].
The distinction matters for evaluating whether this represents actual fraud or methodology disputes [7].
- The Clean Energy Regulator contests Macintosh's interpretation and points to independent auditing, though governance flaws remain [7][11].
- The Chubb Review found the scheme "essentially sound" but recommended reforms, implying problems were real but remediable, not systemic fraud [11].
- The Australian Academy of Science independently identified genuine integrity issues, validating some concerns without endorsing Macintosh's stronger "fraud" characterization [8].
The claim is substantially true in that carbon payments went to projects with existing trees on property, but it conflates this with intentional fraud when the evidence points to methodology disputes about how to measure additionality and attribution.
The Coalition government did pay hundreds of millions in carbon credits (through contracts worth $1.5bn total) for HIR projects, including some that involved property already containing trees [1][3][6].
However, the claim oversimplifies the controversy:
- Macintosh's allegation that credits went for "trees already there" is better described as credits for forests with existing mature trees where additional regeneration was claimed [3][4].
The distinction matters for evaluating whether this represents actual fraud or methodology disputes [7].
- The Clean Energy Regulator contests Macintosh's interpretation and points to independent auditing, though governance flaws remain [7][11].
- The Chubb Review found the scheme "essentially sound" but recommended reforms, implying problems were real but remediable, not systemic fraud [11].
- The Australian Academy of Science independently identified genuine integrity issues, validating some concerns without endorsing Macintosh's stronger "fraud" characterization [8].
The claim is substantially true in that carbon payments went to projects with existing trees on property, but it conflates this with intentional fraud when the evidence points to methodology disputes about how to measure additionality and attribution.