The Albanese Labor Government did introduce world-leading legislation addressing gig economy protections through the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes No. 2) Act 2024 [1].
From 26 August 2024, gig economy workers who work through digital platforms (such as food delivery and rideshare drivers) are now classified as "employee-like workers" and fall under the jurisdiction of the Fair Work Commission [2].
The Fair Work Commission was granted new powers to set minimum standards for these employee-like workers, including terms relating to payment terms, deductions, working time, record-keeping, insurance, consultation, representation, union delegates' rights and cost recovery [3].
The legislation also introduced the Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code from 26 February 2025, which requires platforms to provide advance warnings, human contact options, and a fair process before deactivating workers [4].
The legislation has been recognised as addressing challenges that exist in other nations—for example, UK gig workers remain classified as independent workers, limiting their access to conventional employee benefits like minimum wage, sick leave and holiday pay [6].
While the legislation is genuinely innovative in establishing a new category of "employee-like workers," the claim omits several significant limitations that reduce its effectiveness:
**Classification Boundaries**: The protections only apply to workers who meet the specific definition of "employee-like workers" relying on digital platforms for a substantial portion of their income [7].
This creates a narrow carve-out; workers who are classified as genuine employees or genuine independent contractors fall outside these protections, meaning a substantial portion of gig workers may not be covered [8].
**Limited Scope of Standards**: The Fair Work Commission explicitly cannot set standards for overtime rates and rostering arrangements—two critical factors affecting worker welfare [9].
The minimum pay standards also do not cover "waiting times between deliveries," which can constitute extended unpaid periods depending on when and where workers operate [10].
**Absence of Collective Bargaining Rights**: The legislation does not grant gig workers the right to collectively bargain with platforms, meaning they cannot negotiate as a group—a significant limitation compared to traditional employment protections [11].
This constrains workers' ability to collectively address systemic issues.
**Implementation Timeline**: The legislation came into effect gradually, with minimum standards not beginning until August 2024 and the Deactivation Code from February 2025.
The Fair Work Commission then had to undertake its own process to determine what minimum standards to set, meaning protections are still being defined more than a year after the initial legislation [12].
**Business Pressure and Exemptions**: While intended to protect workers, critics note that imposing costs on the gig economy could increase pressure on small Australian businesses already facing cost-of-living pressures, with exemptions for employers with fewer than 15 employees potentially limiting coverage [13].
The legislation represents a genuine innovation in employment law—Australia did take a different approach than most countries by creating a middle category of worker rather than forcing a binary employee/contractor classification [14].
Gig workers still lack:
- Collective bargaining rights (which traditional employees have) [16]
- Overtime protections
- Coverage for waiting/idle time
- The security of ongoing employment (the Fair Work Commission can only order minimum standards, not guarantee work)
Compared to OECD peers, Australia's approach is innovative but still falls short of full employment protection [17].
Countries like France have taken different approaches—for example, France's Loi d'Avenir (Future Law) granted some social protections to platform workers while still maintaining contractor status [18].
- - 残業 nounZangyou 保護 nounHogo
The most significant issue is that the legislation still leaves gig workers as "non-employees" with contractual protections rather than giving them actual employee status.
This means they:
- Still bear business risks themselves
- Don't receive paid leave, superannuation contributions to the same level, or other traditional employee benefits
- Must rely on the Fair Work Commission to determine what minimum standards apply (rather than having these automatically as employees)
The claim is therefore **technically accurate** but **strategically framed** to emphasize the legislative achievement rather than the lived protections for workers.
The legislation is world-leading in its *approach* to the classification problem, but the actual worker protections remain intermediate between traditional employment and complete independence.
However, the claim overstates the protective scope by implying these are comprehensive protections equivalent to traditional employment, when in fact they represent a middle ground with significant limitations.
However, the claim overstates the protective scope by implying these are comprehensive protections equivalent to traditional employment, when in fact they represent a middle ground with significant limitations.