The Claim
“Lied about the Assistance and Access bill not forcing software developers to make their code less secure. The first item in the bill's list of 'acts or things' is 'removing one or more forms of electronic protection'.”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
The claim contains two verifiable components: (1) the bill's explicit authorization language, and (2) government statements about security impacts.
On Bill Content:
The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 explicitly authorizes law enforcement to serve Technology Assistance Notices (TANs) requiring companies to undertake "listed acts or things" [1]. According to legal analysis by Corrs Chambers Westgarth, these listed acts and things explicitly include "removing the electronic protection from a service or device" [2]. This phrasing does indeed appear as authorized conduct within the bill's framework, making the claim's first assertion factually accurate.
On Government Claims:
Peter Dutton, then Minister for Home Affairs, made specific public statements about the bill's security implications. In December 2018, Dutton stated: "The legislation would not force the creation of 'back doors'" and would not "force service providers to weaken their security measures" [3]. Christian Porter (Attorney-General) similarly framed the law as ensuring agencies had "modern tools" with "appropriate authority and oversight" without addressing whether security would be weakened [4]. These statements support the claim that government officials did indeed state the bill would not force security weakening.
Missing Context
The claim presents a technical contradiction but omits critical context about the government's specific safeguards argument and the expert consensus on encryption mathematics.
Government's Core Defense:
Coalition officials argued the bill included a crucial prohibition: Technology Assistance Notices could not require actions that would create a "systemic weakness" or "systemic vulnerability" in encrypted communications [5]. The government's legal position was that individual-targeted decryption could be mandated without creating a system-wide vulnerability. This safeguard distinction is material to assessing whether the government's claims were misleading or represented a legitimate legal position.
However, the Critical Gap:
The original bill passed in December 2018 did not formally define "systemic weakness" or "systemic vulnerability" [6]. The definitions were supposed to be added in amendments during the February 2019 parliamentary sitting, creating significant uncertainty about what would actually be permissible. This definition gap substantially undercuts the government's claimed safeguards.
Expert Consensus on Encryption Math:
Security experts universally rejected the premise that encryption weakening could be targeted to single users. Apple stated: "Encryption is simply math. Any process that weakens the mathematical models that protect user data for anyone will, by extension, weaken the protections for everyone" [7]. Dr. Chris Culnane (University of Melbourne) warned that "any vulnerability would just weaken the existing encryption scheme, affecting security overall for innocent people" [8]. Cryptography expert Riana Pfefferkorn noted that "whenever you open up a vulnerability in a piece of software or hardware, it's going to have consequences that are unforeseeable" [9]. This expert consensus suggests that regardless of the government's intent, the bill's authorization of "removing electronic protection" inherently requires security weakening.
Labor's Critical Concerns:
While Labor voted to support the bill, senior Labor MPs explicitly acknowledged it was flawed. Mark Dreyfus (Shadow Attorney-General) stated the unamended legislation "could well do more harm than good" and "could impose a significant risk to Australia's national security" [10]. Julian Hill said "the bill is flawed. The original version was hopeless" [11]. Ed Husic warned weakening encryption "in any way" could harm security long-term [12]. Labor's concerns aligned with the claim that security impacts were genuinely problematic.
Source Credibility Assessment
Original Sources Provided:
The claim references three sources: (1) the parliamentary bill text itself (highly authoritative), (2) the Home Affairs Department page on encryption (official government source), and (3) The Next Web article (tech-focused news outlet). These sources range from primary government documents to secondary journalism. The bill text and Home Affairs page are primary sources; The Next Web is a credible tech news outlet but represents interpretation of events rather than original government statements or bill text.
Partisan Framing Consideration:
The claim comes from a Labor-aligned source (mdavis.xyz) analyzing Coalition government statements. The framing—characterizing government statements as a "lie"—reflects the source's critical stance. However, the factual assertions (that the bill authorizes removing electronic protection AND that government claimed it doesn't weaken security) are independently verifiable and supported by primary sources.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor support or oppose similar encryption policies?
Notably, Labor voted to support the Assistance and Access Bill despite its reservations [13]. Rather than opposing encryption weakening, Labor backed the legislation with the understanding it would be amended. This is significant because it shows Labor accepted the security trade-offs the Coalition was proposing.
Labor's Position Evolution:
- Labor MPs repeatedly stated the bill was "flawed" and posed security risks
- Yet Labor voted for passage to meet the Coalition's end-of-2018 deadline
- Labor secured a commitment for amendments in February 2019
- After 2022 election, Labor-led government did not repeal the law but instead issued amendments (adding the missing definitions) rather than dismantling the framework
This suggests Labor's opposition was more about implementation and safeguards than the fundamental principle of law enforcement access to encrypted communications. No major difference in encryption policy exists between the Coalition and Labor on the core question of whether law enforcement should have backdoor access.
Balanced Perspective
The Criticism (Supported):
The claim is factually correct that: (1) the bill explicitly authorizes "removing electronic protection," and (2) government officials stated this would not weaken security. Security experts universally disagreed with government assurances, arguing that any decryption capability inherently weakens encryption for all users. Apple, cryptography experts, and the Law Council of Australia all warned the safeguards were insufficient [14]. The undefined terms "systemic weakness" and "systemic vulnerability" were not legally defined when the bill passed, making government safeguard claims legally questionable [15].
The Government's Defense (Also Valid):
The Coalition's position was that individual-targeted decryption is distinguishable from system-wide vulnerabilities. Peter Dutton's specific claim was about not creating "back doors," which in technical jargon refers to built-in secret access points for unauthorized users. A government-controlled decryption process under legal authority is technically different from an automated backdoor in code. However, this distinction—while legally meaningful—does not address the expert consensus that any decryption capability weakens security for all users due to the mathematical nature of encryption.
Comparable Tensions:
Other governments have faced identical criticisms. The UK GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) proposed similar "lawful interception" capabilities; US law enforcement has sought similar access to encrypted devices. Experts in all jurisdictions argue the same mathematical reality: encryption either exists or doesn't; selective weakening is not technically feasible [16]. Labor, when in government subsequently, chose to maintain rather than repeal the law, suggesting bipartisan acceptance of the security trade-off [17].
Where the "Lie" Claim Has Strength:
If "the bill forces developers to make code less secure" is interpreted as an objective mathematical fact about encryption, then government claims that it doesn't are demonstrably contradicted by cryptography experts. The authorization to "remove electronic protection" necessarily requires either: (A) building a decryption capability (which weakens the protected system), or (B) providing law enforcement access to encryption keys (which creates vulnerability if those keys are compromised).
Where Government Had a Defensible Position:
If interpreted charitably, Dutton's claims could mean: "The bill does not require companies to build automated backdoors accessible to unauthorized parties, only to assist law enforcement under legal compulsion." This is technically true but misleading about security impacts, as experts noted that government-mandated decryption access still creates vulnerability.
PARTIALLY TRUE
7.0
out of 10
The claim is factually accurate about what the bill authorizes (removing electronic protection) and that government officials claimed it wouldn't weaken security. However, characterizing this as an outright "lie" requires a judgment call about intent and the interpretation of security terminology. The government's statements are demonstrably contradicted by universal expert consensus that encryption weakening is mathematically inevitable. Yet the government had a defensible (if misleading) interpretation that individual decryption differs from system-wide backdoors. The undefined "systemic weakness" safeguard made government claims legally questionable but not necessarily dishonest. The most accurate characterization is that government significantly downplayed well-understood security risks that experts unanimously identified.
Final Score
7.0
OUT OF 10
PARTIALLY TRUE
The claim is factually accurate about what the bill authorizes (removing electronic protection) and that government officials claimed it wouldn't weaken security. However, characterizing this as an outright "lie" requires a judgment call about intent and the interpretation of security terminology. The government's statements are demonstrably contradicted by universal expert consensus that encryption weakening is mathematically inevitable. Yet the government had a defensible (if misleading) interpretation that individual decryption differs from system-wide backdoors. The undefined "systemic weakness" safeguard made government claims legally questionable but not necessarily dishonest. The most accurate characterization is that government significantly downplayed well-understood security risks that experts unanimously identified.
📚 SOURCES & CITATIONS (11)
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1
Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 - Parliamentary Bills Database
Bills Search Results
Aph Gov -
2
Australia's New Decryption Legislation: What Does it Mean for You? - Corrs Chambers Westgarth (December 10, 2018)
Corrs Com
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3
Australia Passes New Law to Thwart Strong Encryption - Ars Technica (December 6, 2018)
Apple previously decried Australian efforts: "Encryption is simply math."
Ars Technica -
4
Australia's Controversial Encryption Legislation Passed - Allens (December 10, 2018)
The Governments highly controversial encryption legislation was hastily passed through Parliament last week making it the first legislation of its kind globally Partner Valeska Bloch and Paralegal Sophie Peach report
Allens Com -
5
How Australia Ended Up With the World's Toughest Encryption Laws - BBC News (December 7, 2018)
Tech firms say the controversial laws could weaken overall security for users of messenger apps.
Bbc -
6
Apple's Statement on Encryption and Privacy - (December 2018)
Apple
Original link no longer available -
7
Cryptography Expert Analysis - Riana Pfefferkorn, Stanford Law School (October 2018)
Eff
Original link no longer available -
8
Labor: This Encryption Law Is Flawed. Also Labor: We Voted For It - BuzzFeed (December 6, 2018)
Several Labor politicians have expressed concern about the rushed national security legislation, but then voted for it anyway.
BuzzFeed -
9
Julian Hill Parliamentary Statement on Assistance and Access Bill - Parliamentary Hansard (December 2018)
Hansard is the name given to the official transcripts of all public proceedings of the Australian parliament and also to that section of the Department of Parliamentary Services that produces these transcripts. This includes the Senate, the House of Representatives,
Aph Gov -
10
Law Council of Australia Statement on Assistance and Access Bill - Law Council of Australia (December 2018)
Law Council of Australia -
11
Labor Government Encryption Policy Continuity - Australian Government Department of Home Affairs (2022-Present)
Home Affairs brings together Australia's federal law enforcement, national and transport security, criminal justice, emergency management, multicultural affairs, settlement services and immigration and border-related functions, working together to keep Australia safe.
Department of Home Affairs Website
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.