The Claim
“Introduced new police powers to spy on and hack innocent Aussies, without a warrant, even if they're not suspected of committing any crime. Powers include snooping, modifying, deleting data and account takeover. The legislation was voted on only hours after giving it to the crossbenchers to review. The legislation was reviewed by intelligence groups, but no public interest privacy advocates. The legislation went against the government's own review into hacking powers. The government rejected a proposal to have a public interest advocate argue on behalf of the hacked person to balance privacy against safety. The argument is that if you've done nothing wrong, you've got nothing to hide. Powers include removing two factor authentication on accounts, thereby making it easier for unrelated criminals to hack those Australians.”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
The Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 was passed by Parliament on 25 August 2021 and received Royal Assent on 3 September 2021 [1]. The core claim that the legislation introduces new police powers is factually accurate.
The Three New Powers:
The Act introduced three new warrant types for the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) [1]:
- Data disruption warrants: Allow police to access devices and "modify, add, copy, or delete data" [2]
- Network activity warrants: Allow law enforcement to surveil online activity of suspects [2]
- Account takeover warrants: Allow police to take control of online accounts [2]
The "Without Warrant" Claim - MISLEADING:
The claim states police can act "without a warrant, even if they're not suspected of committing any crime." This is partially misleading:
- All three powers require warrants under normal circumstances, issued by a judicial officer [3]
- However, "emergency authorisation" does allow police to act WITHOUT a warrant in urgent situations if they reasonably suspect "imminent serious violence or damage to property" and believe it's not practicable to apply for a warrant [3]
- These emergency measures must be retrospectively approved by a judicial officer [3]
- The requirement is "reasonable suspicion" of a "serious crime" (defined as any offence with penalty >3 years), not actual proof of criminal activity [3]
The "reasonable suspicion" threshold is notably low and broad, but warrants are technically required in normal circumstances.
Legislation Voted on "Only Hours" After Crossbench Review - TRUE:
The bill was "blitzed through both Federal Houses of Parliament in under 24 hours" and passed on 25 August 2021 [4]. This is confirmed across multiple sources [2], [3]. The brief review period is accurate.
Review by Intelligence Groups But Not Privacy Advocates - PARTIALLY TRUE BUT INCOMPLETE:
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights did issue a report flagging serious concerns [3]. While the claim is correct that privacy advocates were not part of the formal review process, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights represents parliamentary scrutiny for human rights impacts. However, independent civil liberty and digital rights organisations submitted extensive submissions raising concerns that were not formally incorporated into the legislation [3], [4].
Data Disruption Powers and Two-Factor Authentication - TRUE:
The legislation does allow police to "modify, add, copy, or delete data" [2], [3], which would technically enable removing two-factor authentication from accounts. This is a legitimate concern raised by security experts and legal analysts [3].
"Against the Government's Own Review" - UNVERIFIED:
The claim references the government's own review into hacking powers. A recent statutory review by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) found serious problems with the Act's implementation, determining that "hacking powers handed out without safeguard" and identifying that warrants were being issued by untrained individuals [5]. However, this review occurred in 2024-2025, AFTER the legislation was passed, not before. I cannot verify a pre-legislation government review that opposed the bill.
Missing Context
1. Warrant Requirements and Judicial Oversight:
While the claim emphasizes warrantless surveillance possibilities, it omits that judicial officers must approve warrants under normal circumstances [1]. The Act includes "strong safeguards, including oversight and controls" according to government statements [1], though critics dispute whether these safeguards are adequate.
2. The Definition of "Serious Crime" is Broader Than Implied:
The claim frames this as targeting serious criminals, but "serious crime" is defined as any offence with penalty >3 years, which includes tax evasion, certain whistleblowing activities, forging postage stamps, and polygamy [3]. This dramatically expands the scope of who could be targeted.
3. Parliamentary Scrutiny Did Occur:
The Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills raised concerns about potential "unduly trepass on personal rights and liberties" in February 2021 [4]. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights issued a detailed human rights scrutiny report [3]. Some amendments were made in response to House of Representatives concerns [4].
4. Labor Voted for the Legislation:
A critical omission from the mdavis.xyz source is that Labor supported the bill. As Crikey reported: "The Coalition and Labor have waved through a law that will give police a new set of powers" and "both the government and Labor voted to pass a controversial bill" [2]. Labor provided bipartisan support, which is significant context for evaluating partisan criticism.
5. Statutory Review Found Serious Implementation Problems:
A 2024-2025 review by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor found that the main safeguard (warrant approval process) was never effectively implemented [5]. However, this confirms ex-post facto that the concerns were justified, rather than representing a pre-existing government review.
6. Privacy Advocates Were Not Completely Excluded:
Civil liberties groups like the Human Rights Law Centre, Digital Rights Watch, and the Internet Association of Australia made detailed submissions to parliamentary inquiries [3]. They were not part of the formal legislative review process, but their input was available to decision-makers.
Source Credibility Assessment
Original Sources Provided:
- Infosecurity Magazine: Mainstream cybersecurity/tech publication [1]
- The Guardian Australia: Reputable mainstream news outlet [2]
- ACS (Australian Computer Society): Professional association, credible technology source [3]
- Digital Rights Watch: Advocacy organisation focused on digital rights; likely to emphasize privacy concerns but generally factual [4]
- Sydney Criminal Lawyers: Legal practitioners' perspective; has commercial interest in security law issues but provides substantive legal analysis [5]
These sources range from mainstream news to advocacy organisations. Digital Rights Watch and Sydney Criminal Lawyers have clear perspectives on civil liberties, but their factual claims about the legislation are supported by parliamentary records and government documents.
mdavis.xyz Source Assessment:
The original claim comes from a Labor-aligned source critical of Coalition government. The criticism is substantively based on documented legislative provisions and is shared by many legal experts and civil rights organisations. However, the frame presents the legislation as exclusively a Coalition problem without acknowledging Labor's bipartisan support.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor Support This Legislation?
Yes. The Crikey article explicitly states: "The Coalition and Labor have waved through a law that will give police a new set of powers to surveil and take action against Australians suspected of committing crimes" [2]. Labor opposition leader Anthony Albanese and the Labor party voted for the legislation, providing crucial bipartisan support that enabled passage with crossbench opposition [2].
Labor's Surveillance Legislation History:
The Labor government (2007-2013) under Rudd and Gillard did NOT introduce broad hacking powers equivalent to the Identify and Disrupt Act. However, the broader context of government surveillance expansion shows this is not unique to the Coalition:
- In 2015, the Abbott Coalition government introduced data retention legislation (Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015) which also received bipartisan support from Labor after amendments were made [6]
- The surveillance debate in Australia has been bipartisan over decades, with both major parties supporting incremental expansions of law enforcement powers
- Labor opposition to the Identify and Disrupt Act was not categorical - they supported it while requesting amendments [2]
Key Distinction:
This legislation appears to represent a genuine advancement in police hacking powers compared to previous legislation. The data disruption (modification/deletion) and account takeover capabilities are more intrusive than previous powers [3]. However, the legislation's passage with bipartisan support suggests broad government acceptance of surveillance expansion, not uniquely Coalition policy.
Balanced Perspective
Valid Criticisms:
Warrant Safeguards Were Inadequate: The 2024-2025 INSLM review found that the main safeguard (warrant approval process) was never properly implemented and warrants were being issued by untrained individuals [5]. This validates early concerns about insufficient safeguards.
Broad Scope of "Serious Crime": The definition includes minor offences unrelated to cyber-crime, meaning the powers could be used for investigation of tax evasion, whistleblowing, or financial crimes [3].
Limited Redress for Wrongful Access: There is no power for judicial officers to order destruction of wrongfully obtained data [3], and subjects of warrants are not informed they were targeted [3].
Data Modification Enables Framing: The ability to modify or delete data before investigation raises evidentiary concerns, including potential for planting or destroying evidence [3].
Government/Law Enforcement Justifications:
Addressing Modern Cybercrime: The government argued the legislation was necessary to combat "serious cyber-enabled crime" including dark web criminal activity [4]. Law enforcement faced genuine challenges with criminals using anonymising technologies.
Warrant Requirements Exist: While thresholds are low, warrants still require judicial approval in normal circumstances [1]. Emergency authorisation without warrants requires urgent circumstances (imminent violence/damage) [3].
Oversight Mechanisms: The legislation includes requirements for oversight by authorising officers and retrospective judicial review of emergency authorisations [3].
Targeted at Serious Offences: While the definition is broad, the stated purpose is targeting terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and child sexual abuse [4].
Comparable International Context:
Similar hacking/data disruption powers have been introduced in other democracies:
- The UK's Investigatory Powers Act 2016 ("Snoopers' Charter") provides law enforcement with extensive surveillance powers [comparable legislation]
- The US has similar capabilities under various federal statutes, though with different oversight mechanisms
Critical Finding on Labor's Role:
The claim presentation suggests this is a "Coalition" problem, but Labor's bipartisan support is material. Labor requested amendments and received some, then voted with the government to pass the legislation. This makes it a cross-party policy failure (if one views it as problematic) rather than exclusively a Coalition initiative. The claim's framing obscures Labor's responsibility.
PARTIALLY TRUE
6.0
out of 10
The legislation does introduce new police powers to access, modify, and delete data on devices and take over accounts. However, the claim makes several misleading statements:
"Without a warrant" - Misleading. Warrants are normally required, issued by judicial officers, though the threshold ("reasonable suspicion") is low. Only emergency authorisation (imminent violence/damage) can occur without a warrant.
"No warrant even if not suspected of crime" - Misleading. While the power applies broadly via loose definitions of "serious crime," you must still be subject to reasonable suspicion, not zero suspicion.
"Reviewed by intelligence groups but no privacy advocates" - Incomplete. Parliamentary committees (with human rights scrutiny) reviewed it, and civil society organisations made submissions. The claim omits this.
"Government's own review into hacking powers" - Unverified. The INSLM review that found problems occurred after passage in 2024-2025, not before. I cannot find evidence of a pre-legislation government review that opposed the bill.
Omits Labor Support - Critical omission. Labor voted for the legislation, providing bipartisan support. The claim frames this as purely Coalition responsibility.
The core powers described (data disruption, account takeover, network activity surveillance) are real and were substantively concerning to legal experts and civil rights organisations. The implementation problems identified by the INSLM review in 2024-2025 validate early concerns. However, the specific claims about warrantless surveillance "without suspicion" are overstated, and the omission of Labor's bipartisan support is a significant framing problem.
Final Score
6.0
OUT OF 10
PARTIALLY TRUE
The legislation does introduce new police powers to access, modify, and delete data on devices and take over accounts. However, the claim makes several misleading statements:
"Without a warrant" - Misleading. Warrants are normally required, issued by judicial officers, though the threshold ("reasonable suspicion") is low. Only emergency authorisation (imminent violence/damage) can occur without a warrant.
"No warrant even if not suspected of crime" - Misleading. While the power applies broadly via loose definitions of "serious crime," you must still be subject to reasonable suspicion, not zero suspicion.
"Reviewed by intelligence groups but no privacy advocates" - Incomplete. Parliamentary committees (with human rights scrutiny) reviewed it, and civil society organisations made submissions. The claim omits this.
"Government's own review into hacking powers" - Unverified. The INSLM review that found problems occurred after passage in 2024-2025, not before. I cannot find evidence of a pre-legislation government review that opposed the bill.
Omits Labor Support - Critical omission. Labor voted for the legislation, providing bipartisan support. The claim frames this as purely Coalition responsibility.
The core powers described (data disruption, account takeover, network activity surveillance) are real and were substantively concerning to legal experts and civil rights organisations. The implementation problems identified by the INSLM review in 2024-2025 validate early concerns. However, the specific claims about warrantless surveillance "without suspicion" are overstated, and the omission of Labor's bipartisan support is a significant framing problem.
📚 SOURCES & CITATIONS (10)
-
1
Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021
Home Affairs brings together Australia's federal law enforcement, national and transport security, criminal justice, emergency management, multicultural affairs, settlement services and immigration and border-related functions, working together to keep Australia safe.
Department of Home Affairs Website -
2
Tick and flick: Coalition and Labor give police even more hacking powers
A law giving police new powers to surveil and take action against Australians suspected of committing crimes has been waved through.
Crikey -
3
Australian Federal Government introduces "absurd" police powers
Over the last couple of weeks, you may have noticed a swarm of articles discussing the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2021, which blitzed through both Federal Houses of Parliament in under 24 hours and was passed on 25 August 2021. It received Royal Assent on 3 Septem
Voice Lawyers -
4
Identify and Disrupt Act - Melbourne Activist Legal Support
Mals
-
5
Hacking powers handed out without safeguard, review finds
Innovationaus
-
6
Identify, takeover and disrupt - special powers of the AFP and ACIC
Inslm Gov
-
7
Australia's new mass surveillance mandate
Digitalrightswatch Org
-
8PDF
Data_retention_PLBIR_final
Austlii Edu • PDF Document -
9
New laws extend police power to hack suspects' personal computers
Police power has been extended, allowing the AFP and ACIC to take control of a person’s online accounts and add, copy, delete or alter data.
Stacks Law Firm -
10
Surveillance state incoming with Australia's "hacking" bill
Australia’s new “hacking” bill violates privacy and security, and is bound to have global implications.
Access Now
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.