A joint review by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), released in February 2014, confirmed that Australian Navy and Customs vessels entered Indonesian territorial waters six times between 1 December 2013 and 20 January 2014 during Operation Sovereign Borders [1][2].
The review found the incursions were "inadvertent" and arose from "incorrect calculation of the boundaries of Indonesian waters rather than as a deliberate action or navigational error" [1].
While territorial seas normally extend 12 nautical miles from land, Indonesia's archipelagic baselines (declared in March 2009) mean territorial seas can extend much further - something Australian vessel commanders failed to properly account for [3].
The review examined over 2,200 documents and found that headquarters staff had "devolved the obligation to remain outside Indonesian waters to vessel Commanders" without providing authoritative information on Indonesian maritime boundaries [1].
Regarding the claim about crew interviews: The review explicitly states it was "not intended to be a substitute for a detailed external investigation or inquiry" and that "matters relating to professional conduct should be dealt with separately by the ACBPS and the ADF respectively" [1].
While the review itself relied on documentary evidence rather than crew interviews, the Chief of Navy later conducted separate disciplinary proceedings that considered individual conduct - resulting in one officer being removed from command, another administratively sanctioned, and others counselled [4].
**The claim omits several important contextual elements:**
1. **No deliberate intent**: The review found no evidence of deliberate violations - the errors were due to miscalculations, not intentional border crossings [1].
The vessels were attempting to remain outside Indonesian waters but using incorrect boundary calculations.
2. **Systemic failure, not individual negligence**: The report identified systemic problems at headquarters level, where "appropriate controls were not put in place by the relevant headquarters" [1].
Border Protection Command failed to provide authoritative information on Indonesian maritime boundaries to vessel commanders.
3. **Training disparities**: The review found that while Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Commanding Officers had received professional training on UNCLOS provisions, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service personnel lacked training specifically regarding Indonesian archipelagic baselines [1].
4. **Prompt disclosure**: Once discovered, the incursions were "promptly and candidly advised to senior Australian Officials, Government Ministers and in turn the Indonesian Government" [1].
The Australian Government notified Indonesia on 17 January 2014.
5. **Remedial action taken**: Following the discovery, Commander Border Protection Command immediately issued supplementary instructions with correct boundary information and increased oversight requirements [1].
While sometimes viewed as left-leaning, its reporting on this issue was factual and consistent with other sources [5].
**Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)**: One of Australia's major daily newspapers (Fairfax Media).
Generally considered mainstream and credible, with centre-left editorial leanings [6].
**Independent.ie**: Irish newspaper republishing wire service content.
**Did Labor do something similar?**
Search conducted: "Labor government Howard Coalition boat turnback policy border protection navy"
**Finding**: Labor governments under Rudd and Gillard (2007-2013) discontinued the Coalition's previous "Pacific Solution" and boat turnback policies.
* * * *
However, Labor subsequently faced significant criticism for its own border protection challenges:
- **Operation Relex (2001)**: The Howard Coalition government initiated Operation Relex in response to the Tampa incident and MV Tampa crisis, involving naval interception of asylum seeker vessels [7].
This was the predecessor to Operation Sovereign Borders.
- **Labor's discontinuation and subsequent issues**: After discontinuing boat turnbacks in 2008, Labor faced a surge in arrivals and the tragic loss of approximately 1,200 lives at sea between 2008-2013 [8].
In 2013, the Rudd government reinstated offshore processing on Nauru and Papua New Guinea.
- **Comparison**: While Labor governments did not conduct turnback operations that risked territorial incursions (because they weren't conducting turnbacks), both major parties have struggled with the complex balance between border protection, international law obligations, and humanitarian concerns.
The Coalition's territorial incursions occurred while implementing a policy (boat turnbacks) that Labor had previously rejected but which subsequent Labor governments have largely accepted as effective in preventing deaths at sea [9].
- **No direct equivalent**: There does not appear to be a direct Labor equivalent of multiple naval territorial incursions.
However, Labor governments faced their own controversies, including:
- The 2009 SIEV 36 explosion that killed five Afghan asylum seekers and injured 44 others
- Various incidents at offshore processing facilities on Christmas Island and Nauru
- Criticism over "tow-backs" under the Gillard government in 2012
**What the claim doesn't tell you:**
The claim frames the incident as evidence of either incompetence (given GPS technology) or deliberate policy violations, and suggests the government avoided accountability by not interviewing crew.
However, several important counterpoints emerge:
1. **Complex maritime boundaries**: The errors stemmed from a genuine complexity in international maritime law - Indonesia's archipelagic baselines create territorial waters that extend far beyond the standard 12-nautical-mile expectation.
As maritime law expert Sam Bateman noted, "Commanding officers of all our maritime enforcement vessels should have a clear understanding of the law of the sea" - but this knowledge gap was systemic, not individual [3].
2. **Headquarters responsibility**: The review identified that Border Protection Command headquarters failed to provide critical operational information to vessel commanders.
The commanders were making decisions without the necessary authoritative data on Indonesian boundaries [1].
3. **Disciplinary action was taken**: While the review itself relied on documents, the Chief of Navy separately reviewed professional conduct and took disciplinary action against seven commanding officers - removing one from command, sanctioning another, and counselling the rest [4].
The Navy Chief accepted that none deliberately contravened orders.
4. **Policy versus implementation**: The incident represents a gap between policy intent (remain outside Indonesian waters) and implementation capability.
The policy itself was clear; the execution failed due to inadequate planning and information provision.
5. **Operation Sovereign Borders was a new, high-tempo operation**: The incursions occurred in the first months of the newly elected Coalition government's flagship border protection policy.
As the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law noted, the incursions represented violations of international law, but they occurred in the context of establishing complex naval operations [10].
**Comparative context**: This type of operational incident is not unique to Australia or to Coalition governments.
The key question is how governments respond to such incidents - in this case, Australia conducted an internal review, disclosed the violations to Indonesia, and implemented remedial measures including disciplinary action.
The factual claims are essentially accurate: Australian Navy and Customs vessels did enter Indonesian waters six times due to boundary miscalculations, despite having GPS technology.
However, the framing of "high tech GPS navigation" is misleading - the issue was not navigational equipment failure but incorrect understanding of maritime boundaries.
The claim about not interviewing crew members is technically true regarding the review itself, but omits that separate disciplinary proceedings did consider individual conduct with consequences for officers involved.
The claim presents the incursions as evidence of incompetence or deliberate action, whereas the review found they were inadvertent errors stemming from systemic planning failures at headquarters level, not individual negligence.
The government did take remedial action, including disclosing the violations to Indonesia, implementing corrective procedures, and disciplining officers.
The factual claims are essentially accurate: Australian Navy and Customs vessels did enter Indonesian waters six times due to boundary miscalculations, despite having GPS technology.
However, the framing of "high tech GPS navigation" is misleading - the issue was not navigational equipment failure but incorrect understanding of maritime boundaries.
The claim about not interviewing crew members is technically true regarding the review itself, but omits that separate disciplinary proceedings did consider individual conduct with consequences for officers involved.
The claim presents the incursions as evidence of incompetence or deliberate action, whereas the review found they were inadvertent errors stemming from systemic planning failures at headquarters level, not individual negligence.
The government did take remedial action, including disclosing the violations to Indonesia, implementing corrective procedures, and disciplining officers.