The Claim
“Spent $24 billion on new, buggy, spontaneously combusting fighter jets, already years behind schedule, which aren't going to be built in Australia. The jets can't run off warm fuel from a truck which has been sitting in the sun (since the fuel tank is used as a heat sink). The software for firing the guns won't be ready until 3 years after deployment. The software has not passed a security audit. Each plane holds less than 3 seconds of ammunition for the guns.”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
Cost and Procurement
The claim states "$24 billion" for the F-35 program. Australia's total investment in the F-35 program was estimated at approximately $17 billion for 72 aircraft as of 2014-2018, though total program costs including sustainment over the life of the aircraft would reach higher figures. The $24 billion figure appears to be an inflated or projected long-term cost estimate rather than the acquisition cost.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program was initiated under the Howard Government (Coalition) in 2002 when Australia joined as a Level 3 partner in the System Development and Demonstration phase. The decision to purchase 72 F-35A aircraft was announced in 2009 under the Rudd Labor Government, with the first order of 14 aircraft placed in 2014 under the Abbott Coalition Government.
Technical Problems
Fuel/Heat Sink Issues: The claim about warm fuel is accurate. The F-35's fuel system is indeed used as a heat sink to cool the aircraft's systems. Early testing revealed that fuel above certain temperatures (approximately 48°C/118°F) could not be used safely. This was particularly problematic in hot climates where fuel trucks sitting in the sun could exceed these temperatures. This issue was documented in Pentagon testing reports and required operational workarounds.
Gun Software Delay: The claim that gun software would not be ready until 2019 is accurate for the F-35A variant. The internal gun (GAU-22/A) was not operational until Block 3F software was fielded in 2019. The F-35 initially deployed with incomplete combat capabilities, requiring software blocks to unlock full functionality.
Ammunition Capacity: The F-35A carries 182 rounds for its internal GAU-22/A cannon. At the gun's rate of fire (3,300 rounds per minute), this provides approximately 3.3 seconds of ammunition - confirming the claim of "less than 3 seconds" is roughly accurate.
Spontaneous Combustion: There were documented cases of F-35B fires, including a 2014 engine fire at Eglin Air Force Base that led to the temporary grounding of the entire fleet. However, "spontaneously combusting" is an exaggeration - these were mechanical/engine failures, not random combustions.
Security Audit: The claim about software security audits reflects broader concerns about the F-35's complex software systems (over 8 million lines of code). Specific classified security audit results are not publicly available, but the software did undergo extensive testing.
Built in Australia: The claim that jets "aren't going to be built in Australia" is partially misleading. Final assembly and checkout for some Australian F-35s was performed at a facility in Australia (Aerospace Australia Limited at Williamtown), though major assembly occurred at Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Texas.
Schedule Delays: The F-35 program was indeed years behind schedule. Initial operational capability was repeatedly delayed from original projections of 2010-2012 to 2016 (USMC F-35B), 2019 (USAF F-35A), and 2021 (US Navy F-35C).
Missing Context
The F-35 Decision Was Made by Labor
The most critical missing context: The decision to purchase F-35s was made by the Labor Government, not the Coalition. Kevin Rudd announced in 2009 that Australia would acquire 72 F-35s at an estimated cost of $16-17 billion. The Coalition (Abbott Government) continued this program but did not initiate it.
Inherited Program
By 2013 when the Coalition took office, Australia was already deeply committed to the F-35 program with significant sunk costs. Exiting the program would have meant:
- Loss of $500+ million already invested
- Forfeiting industrial participation agreements
- Leaving the RAAF without a modern fighter capability gap
No Viable Alternative
The claim omits that no viable alternative existed. The F/A-18 Hornet fleet was aging, and the only other modern 5th-generation fighter (F-22) was not available for export. The F-35 was the only option for a modern stealth fighter capability.
International Partners
Australia was not alone in procuring the F-35. The program involves eight partner nations (including UK, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark) and multiple foreign military sales customers. All these nations faced the same technical challenges.
Source Credibility Assessment
Tharunka (UNSW student newspaper): A student publication without defense journalism expertise. Limited credibility on technical military matters.
War Is Boring (Medium): A defense blog known for critical coverage of military procurement. Provides useful perspectives but has an editorial stance critical of expensive weapons programs.
The Guardian (2014, 2016): Reputable mainstream international news source. Generally reliable for factual reporting.
Foxtrot Alpha/Jalopnik: Defense-focused blog with credible military technical analysis. Specialized expertise in this area.
The Daily Beast (2014): Mainstream news outlet with general credibility for factual reporting.
Overall, the sources mix credible mainstream outlets with partisan/critical defense blogs. The technical claims (fuel, gun software, ammo) are supported by credible defense analysis, while the framing comes from sources with clear editorial bias against the F-35 program.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor do something similar?
Yes - Labor has an even more significant defence procurement failure in the Collins-class submarines.
Collins Class Submarine Program (Labor 1987)
The Collins-class submarine program was ordered by the Hawke Labor Government in 1987 and represents one of Australia's most troubled defence procurements:
- Cost overruns: Original budget $3.9 billion (1987); actual cost approximately $5 billion+ (equivalent to far more in inflation-adjusted terms)
- Technical failures: The submarines were plagued with problems including:
- Noise and vibration issues (could be detected by surface ships)
- Combat system failures (the Rockwell system had to be completely replaced)
- Propulsion system problems
- Software defects
- Periscope issues
- Schedule delays: The program ran years behind schedule
- Operational readiness: For years, only 1-2 of the 6 submarines were operational at any given time
- Australian-built: Built in Australia (unlike F-35s) at ASC in Adelaide - which contributed to the problems
The Collins program cost overruns and technical failures were at least as significant as F-35 issues, demonstrating that major defence procurement challenges are endemic to complex military programs regardless of which party is in government.
Other Labor Defence Procurement Issues
- Armidale-class patrol boats: Also faced significant issues
- MRH-90 Taipan helicopters: Ordered under Labor, plagued with problems
Balanced Perspective
What the Claim Gets Right
The F-35 program did experience:
- Significant cost growth (though much occurred before Coalition took office)
- Substantial schedule delays (also pre-dating Coalition)
- Genuine technical problems (fuel heat sink, gun software, limited ammo)
- Issues that required workarounds
What the Claim Gets Wrong or Omits
Attribution Error: The Coalition cannot be solely blamed for the F-35 purchase decision. Labor made the commitment in 2009, and the Coalition inherited the program.
Exaggerations: "Spontaneously combusting" is hyperbole. There were fires but not random combustion. The $24 billion figure appears inflated compared to official cost estimates.
Missing Successes: By 2022-2024, Australian F-35s have achieved full operational capability and are considered among the world's most capable fighter aircraft. The technical issues have been largely resolved.
Lack of Alternatives: The claim doesn't acknowledge that Australia needed to replace aging F/A-18s and the F-35 was the only 5th-generation option available.
Comparative Analysis
Both major parties have overseen troubled defence procurements:
- Labor (1987): Collins submarines - severe technical problems, cost blowouts, years of poor readiness
- Coalition (continued 2014): F-35 program - technical problems, delays, but ultimately successful deployment
The F-35's issues were consistent with those experienced by all eight partner nations. This was not uniquely an "Australian government" failure but rather a reflection of the challenges inherent in developing the world's most advanced fighter aircraft.
PARTIALLY TRUE
5.0
out of 10
The core factual claims about F-35 technical problems are accurate - the fuel heat sink issues, gun software delays, and limited ammunition capacity are all documented facts. However, the claim commits a significant attribution error by implying the Coalition initiated this purchase, when the decision was actually made by the Labor Government in 2009. The Coalition continued the program but didn't start it.
Furthermore, the framing ignores the broader context: Australia was committed to the program by the previous government, no viable alternatives existed, and by 2022-2024 the aircraft achieved full operational capability. The comparison to Labor's Collins submarine program demonstrates that major defence procurement challenges are a systemic issue, not unique to either party.
Final Score
5.0
OUT OF 10
PARTIALLY TRUE
The core factual claims about F-35 technical problems are accurate - the fuel heat sink issues, gun software delays, and limited ammunition capacity are all documented facts. However, the claim commits a significant attribution error by implying the Coalition initiated this purchase, when the decision was actually made by the Labor Government in 2009. The Coalition continued the program but didn't start it.
Furthermore, the framing ignores the broader context: Australia was committed to the program by the previous government, no viable alternatives existed, and by 2022-2024 the aircraft achieved full operational capability. The comparison to Labor's Collins submarine program demonstrates that major defence procurement challenges are a systemic issue, not unique to either party.
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.