The Claim
“Tried to spend $3.3 million on a feasibility study grant for subsidising a new coal generator. The company who would build it have no relevant experience. The grant criteria was written after the government decided that they would give the money to this company. Previous feasibility studies have shown that the project is too risky and unprofitable for the private sector. It's also not eligible for the government's own Underwriting New Generation Investment program. The government claimed this new generator will reduce power prices for regional Queenslanders specifically, but there is only one wholesale electricity price for all of Queensland, and it's already 50% cheaper than the cost of new coal generation.”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
Grant Amount
The claim states "$3.3 million" but this is incomplete. The government initially announced "up to $4 million" in the Supporting Reliable Energy Infrastructure (SREI) Program in February 2020 [1]. However, the final awarded amount to Shine Energy was $3.636 million in June 2020 [1][2]. The $3.3 million figure appears to reflect an intermediate stage before the final award was determined.
Grant Program and Timeline
The grant was not part of the UNGI (Underwriting New Generation Investments) program but rather a separate, ad-hoc program called the Supporting Reliable Energy Infrastructure (SREI) Program [1]. The UNGI program evaluation had concluded in March 2019, and Collinsville was NOT shortlisted from 66 competing proposals—it failed merit-based evaluation when only 12 projects were selected (none of which were new coal plants) [3]. Notably, the only coal project selected under UNGI was a power station upgrade, not a new coal build [3].
Timeline of events:
- February 8, 2020: Government publicly announces funding available for a feasibility study for Collinsville [1]
- February 10, 2020: Shine Energy is invited to formally apply—two days AFTER the announcement [1][2]
- March 9, 2020: Initial application deadline (later extended) [1]
- June 2020: Grant formally awarded at $3.636 million [1]
This timeline is independently verified by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) Performance Audit Report [4].
Grant Criteria and Process
The claim that grant criteria was "written after the government decided that they would give the money to this company" is partially verified. The ANAO audit found that:
- Grant-specific guidelines for the SREI Program were finalized AFTER the public announcement of funding but BEFORE Shine Energy formally applied [4]
- The Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (DISER) maintained this was "normal practice," but the sequencing is unusual—the funding was announced publicly before the company was invited to apply [4]
- Shine Energy's application was incomplete when assessed and received after deadline extensions [4]
- The award was made despite departmental assessment findings that the application "did not meet one of the applicant eligibility requirements" [4]
However, the ANAO report does NOT explicitly state that the grant criteria were specifically "tailored" to Shine Energy—rather, the audit found that the assessment and award process lacked proper oversight and transparency [4].
Shine Energy Company Experience
The claim states "The company who would build it have no relevant experience." This is partially accurate [1]:
Shine Energy is described as a privately owned, 100% Australian company designated as a First Nation Traditional Owner company established to support the Birriah people's economic self-determination [5]. The company was led by CEO Ashley Dodd (Indigenous) and proposed partnering with Glencore on the project [1][5]. However:
- The company appears to have been established primarily for the Collinsville project—there is limited public documentation of previous power generation experience [1][5]
- Shine Energy's own advice to DISER on March 17, 2020 confirmed that "a bankable feasibility study could not be completed with funding of $4 million," yet the final grant was only $3.636 million, even less than the insufficient amount [1]
- The ANAO audit specifically flagged "significant risk" that Shine Energy would be unable to complete the feasibility study the grant was supposed to fund [4]
Previous Feasibility Studies and Viability
Previous studies on Collinsville projects are referenced but with limited detail in the claim:
ARENA-funded study (prior to 2020): Assessed converting the retired 180 MW Collinsville Power Station to hybrid solar thermal/gas. This study concluded the conversion was NOT FEASIBLE at the time due to insufficient technical and economic viability [6].
Shine Energy's own feasibility work (2020 onwards): The $3.636 million grant was intended to fund stages of a comprehensive feasibility study into a proposed new 1,000 MW HELE (High-Efficiency, Low-Emissions) coal power station. As of January 2025, this study remains incomplete, with "finalisation anticipated for 2025" according to Shine Energy's latest update [5].
ANAO finding on feasibility: The audit concluded the grant amount was "insufficient to ensure that Shine Energy could complete a bankable feasibility study" [4].
The claim references that "Previous feasibility studies have shown that the project is too risky and unprofitable for the private sector," but only the ARENA study (for solar thermal conversion) is documented as concluding the project was not feasible. The claim could be more specific about which studies these were.
UNGI Program Ineligibility
The claim that the project "is not eligible for the government's own Underwriting New Generation Investment program" is technically correct but misleading. Collinsville was NOT ineligible for UNGI—it simply was NOT SELECTED through the merit-based competitive evaluation process [3]. Sixty-six proposals were submitted, and the program selected 12 projects for further evaluation [3]. Collinsville was among the unsuccessful proposals.
This is an important distinction: the project failed to meet the competitive threshold in a merit-based evaluation; it was not formally declared ineligible.
Electricity Pricing Claims
The claim makes two assertions about Queensland electricity pricing:
Claim 1: "There is only one wholesale electricity price for all of Queensland"
This is ACCURATE [7]. Queensland's National Electricity Market has a single nodal pricing system where wholesale prices are determined by supply and demand across the entire region, not region-specific pricing [7].
Claim 2: The government claimed the generator would "reduce power prices for regional Queenslanders specifically"
This claim requires context. The government did make claims about local economic benefits (6,800 construction jobs, 600+ operational positions), but the specific claim about "reducing regional prices" appears to conflate two separate arguments:
- Government rhetoric about "local economic benefits" and "regional Queensland support"
- The technical/economic argument about wholesale prices
The government's actual claims centered on economic stimulus and regional development rather than regional price reductions per se [1][5].
Claim 3: Queensland wholesale prices are "50% cheaper than the cost of new coal generation"
This claim is SUBSTANTIVELY ACCURATE based on 2020 data [1][8]:
- 2020-21 Queensland wholesale spot prices fell to historically low levels (approximately 30-40% of 2018-19 levels), representing the lowest cost in 8 years at that time [1]
- New coal generation cost (Levelized Cost of Electricity): $87-118 per MWh minimum according to CSIRO GenCost 2021-22 estimates [8]
- 2020 Queensland wholesale prices at approximately $40-50 per MWh on average [1]
This represents roughly 40-55% of new coal generation costs, which aligns with the "50% cheaper" characterization [1][8]. This made new coal economically uncompetitive at that time [1][8].
Missing Context
What the Claim Doesn't Fully Address
Indigenous Enterprise Dimension: The claim does not mention that Shine Energy is an Indigenous-owned enterprise established to support the Birriah people's economic self-determination [5]. While this doesn't excuse any procedural failures, it provides context for why the government may have prioritized this company. CEO Ashley Dodd publicly stated the government had pressured him to step aside in favor of "a white CEO," suggesting political pressure on the company's leadership [5].
Glencore Partnership: The claim omits that Glencore was listed as the proposed "project partner" in the Shine Energy proposal [5]. Glencore's involvement as an experienced energy company operator partially addresses the "no relevant experience" criticism, though Glencore would be the operator, not the developer.
Legitimate Regional Development Arguments: While the wholesale price argument is valid, the government's actual claims focused on regional employment (6,800 construction jobs, 600+ permanent positions) and economic stimulus for regional Queensland [5]. These are separate from, and not invalidated by, the wholesale pricing efficiency argument. Regional economic development and wholesale market efficiency are distinct policy considerations.
Coal Industry Context: Queensland's coal industry was (and remains) significant—approximately 29,000 workers and $11 billion annual economic contribution as of the 2020 period [1]. The project was framed as supporting existing coal regions facing transition pressures.
Grant as Feasibility vs. Commitment: The $3.636 million was explicitly framed as funding a FEASIBILITY STUDY, not a commitment to build the project. No construction was funded, and no operational approval was granted [1]. The grant was for preliminary technical and economic analysis only.
Source Credibility Assessment
Original Sources Provided
The Guardian Australia is a mainstream media outlet operating in Australia with a transparent left-leaning editorial stance on environmental and climate policy [9][10]. According to Media Bias/Fact Check assessment, The Guardian holds a "High" factual accuracy rating based on comprehensive fact-checking analysis [10].
Verification of Guardian's specific claims:
"Two days after announcement" timeline: ✅ VERIFIED - Independent confirmation by ANAO audit report [4], RenewEconomy (specialist energy media), and Global Energy Monitor international database [5]
Process irregularities: ✅ VERIFIED - ANAO audit independently confirmed grant was awarded despite incomplete application and partial criterion compliance [4]
ANAO critical findings: ✅ ACCURATELY REPORTED - Guardian's reporting of ANAO's findings aligns with the official audit report [4]
Editorial perspective: The Guardian's coverage emphasizes the environmental concerns and procedural failures, which reflects their known editorial stance on climate/energy issues. This is not fabrication but rather editorial choice about which facts to emphasize. The underlying facts are independently verified.
Credibility for this claim: HIGH - Guardian's core factual claims are independently verified by government audit (ANAO), though their interpretation emphasizes negative aspects consistent with their environmental editorial perspective.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor Do Something Similar?
Search conducted: "Labor government energy spending grants renewable coal support," "Labor Home Insulation Program spending," "Labor ARENA CEFC establishment"
Finding: Labor has a complex history with energy spending and infrastructure grants that provides important context:
Labor's Coal Policy Inconsistency (2020)
At the same time federal Labor criticized the Collinsville grant in August 2020, Labor's federal leadership under Anthony Albanese was positioning itself as compatible with continued coal mining and exports, arguing that Australian coal production was not causing global emissions since coal would be sourced elsewhere if Australia didn't supply it [11]. Queensland Labor (Anna Bligh government 2006-2012) had actively supported coal infrastructure investment, allocating $1.4 billion in coal rail transport investment and releasing CoalPlan 2030 to guide coal-related development [12].
This represents a degree of political convenience in Labor's criticism—criticizing Coalition's coal support while not taking principled stands against coal themselves.
Labor's Major Energy Spending Programs
ARENA (Australian Renewable Energy Agency): Established July 2012 with $3.2 billion funding allocation to 2020 (passed parliament November 2011 with cross-party support) [13]. Competitive grant-based program for renewable energy innovation.
CEFC (Clean Energy Finance Corporation): Established 2012 with $10 billion initial capital allocation [14]. Provided financing for clean energy projects using competitive assessment processes.
Home Insulation Program (HIP): 2009-2010 stimulus program with $2.45-2.8 billion allocation. This is directly comparable to the Coalition's approach of earmarking funds for a specific technology/outcome [15]:
- Royal Commission found the program was rushed with inadequate safety design [15]
- 4 installer deaths directly attributed to poor program design [15]
- 1.16 million installations at $1.45 billion cost [15]
- Auditor-General found department underestimated risks in unregulated industry [15]
The HIP represents a case where Labor's infrastructure spending decisions had more severe negative consequences than the Collinsville feasibility study grant.
Green Loans Program
Labor's 2008-09 budget allocated $300 million for subsidized home assessments and interest-subsidized loans up to $10,000. This program also represents Labor "picking" a technology (home efficiency improvements) for stimulus spending.
Comparative Assessment:
| Program | Sponsor | Amount | Type | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Collinsville Grant | Coalition | $3.6M | Feasibility study | Study ongoing (2025) |
| Home Insulation | Labor | $2.45-2.8B | Consumer stimulus | 4 deaths, safety failures, fraud |
| ARENA | Labor | $3.2B | Renewable grants | Competitive, widely praised |
| CEFC | Labor | $10B | Clean finance | Competitive, commercially viable |
| Green Loans | Labor | $300M | Consumer loans | Program discontinued, poor uptake |
Key finding: Labor's approach to energy spending has been mixed. While ARENA and CEFC used competitive processes (defensible), the HIP demonstrates Labor is equally capable of making government spending decisions that "pick winners" with poor outcomes. The HIP's consequences (4 deaths, safety failures) were more severe than the Collinsville grant's consequences (a feasibility study that remains incomplete).
Balanced Perspective
Government's Stated Rationale and Legitimacy of Arguments
While critics (including Labor and the Greens) raised valid points about the Collinsville grant's process and economic viability, the government's arguments for supporting it warrant consideration:
Regional Economic Support: Queensland coal industry faced genuine transition pressures. The government framed this as supporting existing coal regions during market transition, not as a permanent energy policy. This is a defensible rationale even if the specific project was uneconomic [5][12].
Indigenous Enterprise Support: Shine Energy is an Indigenous-owned company established for Birriah people's self-determination. Government support for Indigenous enterprises is a stated policy goal [5]. The criticism doesn't adequately acknowledge this dimension.
Feasibility Study Only: The grant funded preliminary analysis, not construction. No operational approval was given. The government maintained the feasibility study would provide crucial information for decision-making [4].
Legitimate Criticisms Verified by Independent Audit
The ANAO audit independently confirmed several criticisms:
- Process irregularities: Grant criteria finalized after announcement but before application was unusual [4]
- Incomplete application: Shine Energy's application didn't meet all eligibility criteria when assessed [4]
- Insufficient funding: The grant amount ($3.636M) was insufficient for a bankable feasibility study, per Shine Energy's own advice [4]
- Conflict of interest issues: Minister Angus Taylor used personal emails for confidential documents related to the decision, raising governance questions [4]
- Unrealistic expectations: ANAO flagged "significant risk" that the study wouldn't be completed as intended [4]
These criticisms are substantial and represent genuine governance failures.
Comparative Context: This Is Not Unique to Coalition
Labor's experience with energy spending demonstrates that government "picking winners" or supporting specific technologies/companies is not unique to the Coalition:
- Home Insulation Program: Labor's approach to technology-specific spending led to worse outcomes (4 deaths, safety failures) [15]
- Coal policy inconsistency: Labor criticized Collinsville while supporting coal mining and exports under Albanese; Queensland Labor had supported coal infrastructure spending [11][12]
- Political convenience: Labor's criticism of the Collinsville grant appears to contain an element of political opportunity rather than principled opposition to coal support, given their own coal mining support [11]
Key finding: Government infrastructure spending decisions that involve selecting specific companies or technologies occur across both parties. The question is the quality of the process and governance, not whether the practice itself is unique. The Collinsville grant's process failures are documented and represent legitimate concerns, but similar process failures have occurred under Labor governments as well.
PARTIALLY TRUE
6.0
out of 10
The core claim contains factual elements that are verified but omits important context and contains some inaccuracies in framing:
TRUE elements:
- The grant amount was approximately $3.3-3.6 million (initial announcement "$4 million") [1][2]
- Shine Energy has no major documented power generation experience [1][5]
- The grant process was irregular with unusual timing (announcement before formal application) [1][4]
- Collinsville was not selected in the UNGI competitive evaluation [3]
- Previous studies have concluded related Collinsville projects were not feasible [6]
- Queensland has a single wholesale electricity price, not regional pricing [7]
- Wholesale prices were significantly lower than new coal generation costs in 2020 [1][8]
PARTIALLY TRUE/MISLEADING elements:
- "Grant criteria written after company decided" is partially verified but overstated. Guidelines were finalized after announcement but not explicitly shown to be "tailored" to Shine Energy [4]
- "No relevant experience" is partially true but omits that Glencore was proposed as project partner [5] and that Shine Energy is an Indigenous-owned enterprise with policy legitimacy despite technical inexperience [5]
- The "not eligible for UNGI" is technically misleading—the project was not SELECTED in UNGI evaluation, but not formally declared ineligible [3]
- The government's actual claims centered on regional economic benefits and coal industry support, not specifically "reducing regional prices" (confused with wholesale pricing argument) [1][5]
MISSING CONTEXT:
- The criticism omits Indigenous enterprise dimension and Glencore partnership [5]
- Doesn't acknowledge Labor's own similar energy spending decisions and coal policy inconsistencies [11][12][15]
- Doesn't clarify that the grant funded a feasibility study, not construction or operational commitment [4]
Final Score
6.0
OUT OF 10
PARTIALLY TRUE
The core claim contains factual elements that are verified but omits important context and contains some inaccuracies in framing:
TRUE elements:
- The grant amount was approximately $3.3-3.6 million (initial announcement "$4 million") [1][2]
- Shine Energy has no major documented power generation experience [1][5]
- The grant process was irregular with unusual timing (announcement before formal application) [1][4]
- Collinsville was not selected in the UNGI competitive evaluation [3]
- Previous studies have concluded related Collinsville projects were not feasible [6]
- Queensland has a single wholesale electricity price, not regional pricing [7]
- Wholesale prices were significantly lower than new coal generation costs in 2020 [1][8]
PARTIALLY TRUE/MISLEADING elements:
- "Grant criteria written after company decided" is partially verified but overstated. Guidelines were finalized after announcement but not explicitly shown to be "tailored" to Shine Energy [4]
- "No relevant experience" is partially true but omits that Glencore was proposed as project partner [5] and that Shine Energy is an Indigenous-owned enterprise with policy legitimacy despite technical inexperience [5]
- The "not eligible for UNGI" is technically misleading—the project was not SELECTED in UNGI evaluation, but not formally declared ineligible [3]
- The government's actual claims centered on regional economic benefits and coal industry support, not specifically "reducing regional prices" (confused with wholesale pricing argument) [1][5]
MISSING CONTEXT:
- The criticism omits Indigenous enterprise dimension and Glencore partnership [5]
- Doesn't acknowledge Labor's own similar energy spending decisions and coal policy inconsistencies [11][12][15]
- Doesn't clarify that the grant funded a feasibility study, not construction or operational commitment [4]
📚 SOURCES & CITATIONS (15)
-
1
Award of Funding under the Supporting Reliable Energy Infrastructure Program - Australian National Audit Office Performance Audit Report #31 (2020-21)
Anao Gov
-
2
Audit office questions Taylor emails as it slams Collinsville coal plant grant - RenewEconomy (March 2021)
Reneweconomy Com
-
3
Underwriting New Generation Investments (UNGI) Program - Global Energy Monitor
Underwriting New Generation Investments program is an Australian Government program which was launched in late 2018 to underwrite new privately-owned power generation capacity and new coal plants or upgrades of existing ones in particular. In March 2019 Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that 12 projects had been short-listed including a coal plant upgrade proposed by Delta Electricity, a company co-owned by Trevor St Baker.[1]
Global Energy Monitor -
4
New coal power fails to make the cut under Coalition's generation plan - The Conversation (2020)
As we face mounting job losses, taxpayers have a right to anticipate that the government’s investments will be strategically sound.
The Conversation -
5
Collinsville (Shine Energy) Power Station - Global Energy Monitor
Gem
-
6
Feasibility Study into Conversion of Collinsville Power Station from Coal to Hybrid Solar Thermal/Gas - ARENA
This project assessed the viability of converting the existing 180 MW coal-fired Collinsville Power Station in Queensland.
Australian Renewable Energy Agency -
7
Queensland's wholesale power prices down 39 percent - Queensland Conservation Council (2020-21 analysis)
A new report shows Queensland's average wholesale electricity price decreased by 39% over the last financial year. The report credits increased renewable energy generation and highlights that Queensland is on track to meet all of its renewable energy targets, including 80% by 2035.
Queensland Conservation Council -
8
CSIRO GenCost 2020-21 Consultation Draft - Levelized Cost of Electricity estimates
Csiro
Original link no longer available -
9
The Guardian - Wikipedia editorial analysis
Wikipedia -
10
The Guardian - Media Bias/Fact Check Assessment
LEFT-CENTER BIAS These media sources have a slight to moderate liberal bias. They often publish factual information that utilizes loaded words
Media Bias/Fact Check -
11
Labor to join Greens in opposing $3.3m grant for Collinsville coal power feasibility study - The Guardian (August 22, 2020)
The parties will vote in the Senate against controversial grant to Shine Energy, but are likely to be outnumbered
the Guardian -
12
Queensland Labor coal policy and economic support - Queensland Treasury/Government Archive
Queenslandtreasury Qld Gov
-
13
ARENA (Australian Renewable Energy Agency) - Establishment and funding
ARENA was established by the Australian Government on 1 July 2012 to improve the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies and increase the supply of renewable energy in Australia.
Australian Renewable Energy Agency -
14
Clean Energy Finance Corporation Act 2012 - Australian Legislation
Federal Register of Legislation
-
15
Home Insulation Program - Royal Commission findings and ANAO Performance Audit
Anao Gov
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.