The Claim
“Refused to tell the public how much they're paying a private company to build the COVID vaccine passport system which is already 6 months behind schedule. ---”
Original Sources Provided
✅ FACTUAL VERIFICATION
The claim contains two separate assertions:
1. Government Refused to Disclose Costs
FALSE/MISLEADING - This claim is partially inaccurate. While the government was initially reluctant to confirm details in September 2021, the contract information was available through public procurement channels.
At the time of the ZDNet article (September 13, 2021), Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews had just announced the Digital Passenger Declaration (DPD) contract with Accenture, but Home Affairs had "declined to comment" on specific cost figures [1]. However, the Australian Financial Review had already reported a "$60 million deal" days earlier [2], and this information became publicly available through AusTender, the government's official procurement transparency portal [3].
The contract details show Accenture won a base contract worth $3.57 million with an amendment adding $13.59 million, totaling approximately $17.16 million initially disclosed, with the broader "permissions capability" framework mentioned as involving $60 million over three years [2][3].
Context: Government reluctance to immediately provide cost details is common during initial project announcements, but the amounts were discoverable through standard procurement channels within days.
2. Project Six Months Behind Schedule
TRUE - Labor's Andrew Giles accurately stated the schedule delay in September 2021.
According to the ZDNet article, Giles claimed: "This project is already six months late -- the contract was supposed to be awarded and successful provider announced in March 2021" [1]. The actual announcement came in September 2021, confirming the six-month delay [2].
The ITNews article corroborates this timeline, noting Home Affairs had "approached the market for the permission-based services platform in October 2020" with the intention to have a contractor selected by March 2021 [2].
Missing Context
The original claim omits several critical details about the project's outcome and actual costs:
Project Failure and Cost Escalation
While the initial contract announcement mentioned $60 million over three years, the actual final cost of the Digital Passenger Declaration was significantly higher. According to the Sydney Morning Herald's July 2022 report, the government spent $75 million to develop the DPD, which was then scrapped after only 5 months of operation in February 2022 [4].
Why the Project Failed
The DPD was launched in February 2022 to replace paper-based incoming passenger cards and the Australia Travel Declaration form. However, it suffered from severe usability problems:
- The app had a rating of 1.3 stars out of 5 on Apple's App Store (from 1,200+ reviews) and 1.2 stars on Google Play [5]
- Users complained the system was "buggy," required re-entry of all information for every flight, had non-functional QR code scanning for vaccination certificates, and required outdated hotel Wi-Fi scanning while overseas [4]
- The system still required passengers to fill out paper arrival cards anyway, making the digital system redundant [4]
- Home Affairs Minister Clare O'Neil later admitted the app "needs a lot more work to make it user friendly" [5]
Government Scrapped the System
In July 2022, just five months after launching, the federal government scrapped the requirement for the DPD entirely, with Home Affairs Minister Clare O'Neil announcing the changes on the basis of "feedback" about the digital passenger declaration [5].
Context: Similar to Previous Failures
This was not the government's first attempt to digitize border entry processes. The government had previously attempted a similar initiative in 2017 called "Seamless Traveller," which also failed [5].
Source Credibility Assessment
ZDNet:
ZDNet is a technology news publication owned by Ziff Davis, a mainstream tech media company. ZDNet Australia's reporting on government technology projects is generally reliable, particularly for infrastructure procurement reporting. However, this specific article is relaying Labor Party statements (Andrew Giles) and reporting on an announced project that hadn't yet launched. The article's framing emphasizes the government's lack of transparency and cost comparison to previous failures (COVIDSafe, visa processing attempts), which reflects Labor's critical positioning [1].
Original reporting: The ZDNet article itself cites Australian Financial Review reporting on the contract, suggesting the information had already been disclosed to financial media sources [1][2].
Assessment: ZDNet's reporting is factually accurate regarding the timeline and the Labor position, but the framing emphasizes government secrecy rather than acknowledging the information was available through procurement channels.
Labor Comparison
Did Labor do something similar?
Search conducted: "Labor government IT projects transparency costs procurement history"
Finding: Labor governments have also faced criticism for large IT project cost transparency and failures [6][7]. Notable precedents include:
National Broadband Network (NBN): Labor's 2009 $43 billion national broadband project had significant cost blowouts and transparency issues. The Coalition's later modifications added approximately $31 billion to the project cost according to financial analysis, though this was partly due to Coalition policy changes rather than pure Labor failure [6][7].
Healthcare IT Projects: Labor's Health Department had multiple IT procurement projects that faced similar transparency and cost management challenges during their administration (2007-2013), though specific examples of "vaccine passport" equivalents don't exist (as COVID-19 occurred after Labor left office) [8].
General Pattern: Both major parties have struggled with government IT procurement transparency and cost overruns. This is a systemic issue affecting Australian government procurement across both Coalition and Labor administrations [6][7].
Key difference: Labor had no direct equivalent to the DPD because COVID-19 occurred during Coalition government (2013-2022). However, Labor's handling of similarly complex digital health infrastructure projects showed comparable transparency challenges.
Balanced Perspective
What the claim gets right:
The government was initially reluctant to disclose specific costs in September 2021, and the project was genuinely six months behind the original March 2021 procurement timeline [1]. These facts are accurate.
What the claim omits:
Information was available: While the government declined to comment immediately, the $60 million figure was already reported in major financial media and was discoverable through AusTender [2][3]. This is not unusual government behavior during project announcements.
Cost transparency is complex: Government IT procurement transparency involves balancing commercial sensitivity with public accountability. The eventual actual cost of $75 million for a failed system is a legitimate concern, but this information only became clear after implementation, not during the September 2021 announcement [4].
The real story is project failure, not secrecy: The legitimate issue here is not that costs were "hidden" from the public, but that the $75 million project failed spectacularly after 5 months, with extremely poor user experience (1.3 stars) and redundant functionality (still required paper forms) [4][5]. This is the actual governance failure.
Government did acknowledge delays: While reluctant about immediate cost disclosure, the government acknowledged the project was 10-month tendering process, and Labor's timeline criticism appears accurate [1][2].
Systemic issue: IT procurement cost overruns and initial secrecy are common across both major Australian parties. This is not unique to the Coalition, though the 5-month failure timeline suggests worse execution than typical overruns [6][7].
Expert perspective:
Government IT procurement transparency advocates have noted that Australian government agencies struggle with cost disclosure during tender processes due to commercial-in-confidence provisions, but this doesn't excuse the eventual $75 million failure. The real issue is project governance and testing, not transparency at announcement time [3].
Key context: This project exemplifies a broader pattern of Australian government IT failures—not unique to the Coalition, but a shared challenge across administrations.
PARTIALLY TRUE
5.5
out of 10
The claim accurately identifies two facts (initial reluctance to disclose costs and genuine project delay), but substantially misrepresents the transparency issue. The government did decline to immediately comment on costs in September 2021, but the information was discoverable through proper channels within days and was already being reported in major financial media [1][2][3].
The more significant issue the claim obscures is the actual governance failure: the $75 million project that delivered a buggy, redundant system and was scrapped after 5 months [4][5]. This represents poor project execution and testing, not secrecy about costs.
The claim uses "refused to tell the public" language suggesting deliberate concealment, when the reality is the government was reluctant to provide immediate details on an announced but not-yet-launched project—a common procurement practice, not corruption [1].
Final Score
5.5
OUT OF 10
PARTIALLY TRUE
The claim accurately identifies two facts (initial reluctance to disclose costs and genuine project delay), but substantially misrepresents the transparency issue. The government did decline to immediately comment on costs in September 2021, but the information was discoverable through proper channels within days and was already being reported in major financial media [1][2][3].
The more significant issue the claim obscures is the actual governance failure: the $75 million project that delivered a buggy, redundant system and was scrapped after 5 months [4][5]. This represents poor project execution and testing, not secrecy about costs.
The claim uses "refused to tell the public" language suggesting deliberate concealment, when the reality is the government was reluctant to provide immediate details on an announced but not-yet-launched project—a common procurement practice, not corruption [1].
📚 SOURCES & CITATIONS (8)
-
1
Labor says government's digital vaccine passport is six months behind schedule
Prior to starting work on the DPD, the federal government has spent almost AU$170 million on its visa processing privatisation plans and over AU$6 million for the COVIDSafe app
ZDNET -
2
Accenture wins contract for passenger declarations platform
Incoming passenger cards finally to get the chop.
iTnews -
3
ACCENTURE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD contract with Department of Home Affairs
Explore deep insights into Australian Government contracts, suppliers, agencies, and categories.
Tenders+ -
4
Digital Passenger Declaration (DPD) app scrapped and good riddance
I can't believe many Australian travellers would be mourning the loss of the Australian Digital Passenger Declaration.
Traveller -
5
Australia scraps digital passenger cards for international arrivals
Minister concedes app "needs a lot more work".
iTnews -
6
Inside the bloody political war that led to a $31b NBN blowout
The NBN has cost a lot more public money than Labor promised back in 2009 but the Coalition’s meddling was largely to blame for a decade of misguided spending.
Australian Financial Review -
7
Parliamentary Inquiry Chapter 4 - Contracting
Chapter 4 Contracting Introduction 4.1 The committee’s Second Report foreshadowed an examination of the NBN Co’s procurement policy and tendering processes.[1] This
Aph Gov -
8
Transparency in Commonwealth Government Procurement
Finance Gov
Rating Scale Methodology
1-3: FALSE
Factually incorrect or malicious fabrication.
4-6: PARTIAL
Some truth but context is missing or skewed.
7-9: MOSTLY TRUE
Minor technicalities or phrasing issues.
10: ACCURATE
Perfectly verified and contextually fair.
Methodology: Ratings are determined through cross-referencing official government records, independent fact-checking organizations, and primary source documents.